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Abstract 
One of the most vital cognitive skills is the ability to distinguish agents (entities that 
have mental states) from non-agents. Without this ability, we would be unable to adapt our 
behavior in encounters with other beings, to communicate and to interact with others. This 
distinction is so crucial to survival and to successful social exchange that some have claimed 
it to be anchored in innate systems. In fact, infants show remarkable capabilities of 
discriminating agents from non-agents on the basis of behavioral cues. This dissertation 
addressed the question whether cues hypothesized to elicit agency attributions in infancy 
influence infants’ attention in a way that prepares them for subsequent actions and interactions 
with agents by interpreting these agents as directed and referential. Study I investigated 
orienting of visuospatial attention in 5- and 7-month-old infants during the observation of 
human movement and nonhuman, agentive movement. Results showed that younger infants 
needed human movement whereas older infants could infer directional orientation from 
nonhuman, self-propelled movement. Study II extended these findings by investigating 
whether 7-month-olds could infer directional information from a static object after observing 
the object exhibit contingent, self-propelled movement patterns. Results indicated that infants 
were able to maintain agency attribution even in absence of these cues and attributed a 
directional orientation to the agent. Study III investigated attentional engagement and 
disengagement while infants observed an inanimate object exhibit two communicative agency 
cues (gaze and voice). In this study, both gaze and voice evoked increased capturing of 
attention in 7-month-olds, but only voice facilitated disengagement and orienting of attention. 
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that infants show modulation of visuospatial 
attention when they observe objects exhibit agency cues. This indicates that they perceive 
these objects as directed and referential.   
- 6 - 
 
  




- 8 - 
 
  
- 9 - 
 
1. Introduction 
Imagine yourself in a park: There are people walking, dogs running, a duck starting off 
for a flight from the pond, but also trees moving in the breeze, leaves floating through the air, 
maybe balls being kicked. A complex environment full of static and dynamic things. Within 
an instant you can tell whether these things are alive and human, whether they move by 
themselves or are being moved by others, and whether they can interact in meaningful ways 
with you. Although we are hardly ever aware of it, this instantaneous discrimination is vital: It 
enables us to anticipate the action of others, to reason about their intentions, and to 
communicate with them. How can we tell which of all these entities are agents – intentional 
beings that can pursue goals – and which are non-agents? The key to this discrimination lies 
in specific behavioral and perceptual characteristics - namely, agency cues – which humans 
are sensitive to from early on. This thesis deals with infants’ ability to detect agents on the 
basis of these cues. 
Agents are directed upon, or about, something (Lycan, 1999): Their behavior is guided 
by beliefs, desires, and goals; they are potential predators, prey, or partners of social 
interaction. Throughout human evolution, encounters with agents, specifically predators or 
prey, have probably posed one of the strongest selection pressures to humans. For this reason, 
it has been proposed that the ability to detect agents evolved as a consequence of evolutionary 
adaptation (Barrett, 2005). In fact, the past decades of research in developmental psychology 
have shown that this ability is at least already partly functional in early infancy, some aspects 
of it maybe even from birth on. In general, researchers agree that infants discriminate agents 
from non-agents on the basis of certain perceptual or behavioral cues (Biro, Csibra, & 
Gergely, 2007). However, studies on agency perception with infants share some 
methodological limitations: Most studies present infants with demonstrations of an agent in 
action and measure their evaluation of this action, mostly with regard to the agent’s action 
goals (e.g., habituation procedures, or assessment of anticipatory eye movements toward a 
goal). This often includes repeated demonstrations of the same actions to give the infant 
enough time to encode every aspect of the scene. However, encounters with agents demand 
immediate responses from the organism instead of, for example, feedback-based learning 
(Barrett, 2005). Detection of agents therefore has to occur before goals are evaluated or 
intentions are assigned, on the basis of little information, and immediately upon encounter.  
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In this thesis I propose that infants’ response to agency cues can be measured within 
brief periods of stimulus presentation by assessing the modulation of visuospatial attention. 
Moreover, I suggest that this modulation of attention shows infants’ ability to perceive an 
entity as directed and referential on the basis of behavioral cues. In the first section, I present 
a cue-based approach to agency detection in infancy. The theoretical background from which 
these cues can be derived is presented in the second section of the first chapter. I then classify 
the agency cues investigated in this thesis and review empirical evidence documenting 
infants’ early sensitivity to these agency cues. A paradigm is presented which provides an 
adequate measure of the proposed changes in visuospatial attention. Finally, I present and 
discuss three own studies on the investigation of attentional modulation.  
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2.  Detecting agents in infancy 
2.1 A cue-based approach 
It has been argued that the ability to detect agents emerged as a consequence of 
evolutionary pressures (Barrett, 2005; Leslie, 1994). Barrett proposes the evolution of an 
Agency System which contains several information processing features which enable the 
organism to make strategic inferences about intentional beings. These features include (1) a 
perceptual triggering system to detect agents, (2) perceptual mechanisms for discriminating 
between different kinds of agents, (3) perceptual mechanisms for discriminating between an 
agent’s intentions and behaviors, (4) an inferential device for reasoning about mental states, 
and (5) a variety of systems that modulate general “settings” of the system itself (i.e., 
emotional and executive systems for the regulation of perceptual thresholds, attention, and the 








Figure1. Agency System adapted from Barrett (2005, p. 204) 
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In his model, Barrett proposes that the first, obligatory step in reasoning about agents 
and their intentions is the detection and discrimination of agents from nonagents. This 
discrimination has to be made in a complex environment, often on the basis of minimal 
differences in perceptual input, and within extremely brief periods of time. The present thesis 
deals with this first level of the Agency System. More precisely, I investigate how perceptual 
inputs to the Agency System – namely, Agency Cues – modulate infants’ attention. This 
modulation of attention, I argue, can be interpreted as an indicator for detection and 
categorization of an entity as an agent because it reflects the organism’s rapid adaptation to an 
encounter with a potential predator, prey, or partner for social interactions.  
The cues Barrett proposes to provide the first input to the Agency System can be 
derived from earlier theoretical accounts on agency perception. In the following sections, I 
review the main theories on infants’ developing ability to categorize entities as agents – a 
simulationist account, two modularist accounts and a recent theory on communicative agency. 
Theories on agency detection can be framed differently, for example with regard to their 
assumptions on developmental processes or the role of experience versus innateness. I will 
review the basic assumptions of three different theories with regard to their assumptions on 
agency-cues.  
2.1.1 Simulationist accounts 
According to the basic assumption of simulationists, the understanding of agents and 
their actions results from the matching of an agent’s action onto one’s own action repertoire. 
This ability is determined by the infant’s own experience with observed actions as well as the 
identification of other agents as similar to the infant’s self (Meltzoff, 2007; Tomasello, 2009) 
(Tomasello, 1999; Meltzoff, 2007). In his like-me-hypothesis, Meltzoff (2007) proposed that 
infants form relationships between their own actions and the bodily states that accompany 
them and, by attributing the same kind of relationship to another agent, infer mental states on 
the basis of the observed action.  According to Meltzoff (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1997), this 
identification process is functional from birth on and can be observed in neonatal imitation. 
Woodward and colleagues (e.g., Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005; Woodward, 
1998) claim that the understanding of another agent’s action goals relies on experience-based 
motor simulation of the observed actions. The notion of motor simulation as the basis for 
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action understanding has received neurophysiological support by advocates of the mirror 
neuron hypothesis (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996), which argues that the neuronal correlate 
of action understanding is determined by neurons that are activated both during the perception 
and execution of actions. It has been suggested that the mirror neuron system is specifically 
tuned to biological motion; however, simulation processes have recently also been reported 
for anthropomorphic robot movement (e.g., Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, & Keysers, 2007; 
Press, Bird, Flach, & Heyes, 2005). In sum, the main cue to agency perception through 
simulation is the identification of human or human-like features.  
2.1.2 Modularist accounts 
Modularist accounts on the perception of agency propose that the mechanisms for the 
detection of agency are organized in specialized modules. In his tripartite theory of agency, 
Leslie (Leslie, 1994, 1995) defines agents as a class of objects that can be distinguished from 
other physical objects by their mechanical properties, actional properties, and cognitive 
properties. Central to an agent’s mechanical properties is its possession of an internal and 
renewable source of FORCE (Leslie’s notion of a representation of energy), a view which is 
closely related to Premack’s (1990) idea of self-propelledness (see section 2.2.2). Agents’ 
actional and cognitive properties refer to the capability of pursuing goals, perceiving their 
environment by interacting with other agents, but also their ability to hold psychological 
states toward their environment, such as attitudes, or beliefs. These agent-specific properties 
are detected through the functioning of three hierarchically organized, specialized modules: 
Theory of Body (ToBy), and two Theory of Mind Mechanisms (ToMM1 and ToMM2). On the 
first level of the hierarchy, ToBy’s function is to detect mechanical agency on the basis of an 
object’s physical properties by attending to sources of FORCE in an object’s motion. The 
likelihood of being identified as an agent by ToBy increases with evidence that an object is 
capable of initiating motion by itself, and not as the result of external impact. ToBy is 
functional around the age of 6 months. On the next level in the hierarchy, ToMM1 and ToMM2 
detect the intentional properties of agents. While ToMM1 interprets behavior in terms of 
teleological causality – that is, the states of affairs an agent is acting to bring about, ToMM2 is 
sensitive to attitudes an agent holds toward the world (psychological causality). Thus, the 
function of ToMM1 involves the detection of goal-directedness of an agent’s interaction with 
its environment and other agents, while ToMM2 attends to relations between an agent and 
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reality. Throughout development, these subsystems are hierarchically organized, that is, the 
lower-level systems provide input for the higher-level system. While ToBy feeds information 
about physical agency to ToMM1, ToMM1 incorporates this information and provides ToMM2 
with information about goal-directed actions that are needed to infer mental states. ToMM1 
becomes functional in about the second half of the first year, ToMM2 comes into play in the 
first half of second year. 
A theory that draws on similar assumptions as Leslie’s tripartite theory of agency was 
proposed by Baron-Cohen (1995). Baron-Cohen captures and extends Leslie’s proposals 
especially with regard to the most basic level of agency detection, the interpretation of 
physical and dynamic events. He proposes an Intentionality Detector (ID), a perceptual device 
for the interpretation of dynamic events in terms of goals and desires: “If you see an animal 
moving, be it an amoeba, a mouse, or a British prime minister, all you need to refer to in order 
to begin to interpret its movement are these two basic mental states” (Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
p.33). This notion exceeds Leslie’s mechanical agency properties in that it allows a broader 
range of interpretations: from intentions that are derivable from immediate observation (“he is 
walking into the parliament”) to more sophisticated accounts of intentional behavior, such as 
“he wants power”. The ID overattributes agency (i.e., goals and desires) to any entity 
engaging in self-propelled motion, potentially resulting in a lot of false-positives. Crucially, 
ID is a mechanism not for making sense of physical causality (as ToBy is) but of the social or 
animate world. By choosing this definition, Baron-Cohen explicitly does not distinguish 
between animacy and agency in terms of movement behavior. Similar to Leslie’s ToMM1, ID 
interprets actions of agents as goal-directed. On superordinate hierarchy levels, Baron-Cohen 
proposes a specialized mechanism for the detection of eye directions (Eye-Direction-Detector; 
EDD), allowing the attribution of perceptual states and dyadic representations between the 
agent and an object, and a Shared-Attention-Mechanism (SAM), creating triadic 
representations among the agent, the self, and an external object. Distinct from ID, EDD and 
SAM, a fourth mechanism, the Theory-of-Mind Mechanism (ToMM) represents the epistemic 
mental states of an agent (thinking, knowing, dreaming, guessing, pretending, etc.). Similar to 
This device receives input from ID, EDD and SAM to construct a full theory of mind. Until 9 
months, the infant possesses only ID and basic functions of EDD and can build dyadic 
representations. At around 9 to 18 months, SAM becomes functional and triggers the 
emergence of ToMM between 18 and 48 months of age. Agency cues derived from these 
accounts that are important for the purpose of this thesis are those that are supposed to be 
- 15 - 
 
input to the basic modules (ToBy and ID) – cues to an agent’s physical properties, for 
example movements, and physical interactions between objects.  
2.1.3 Communicative agency  
A recent approach extends the theoretical notion of agency by the communicative 
intentions of agents (Csibra, 2010; Gergely, 2011) and thereby accounts for the referential 
nature of agency (Csibra, 2003). Strictly spoken, the referential nature of agency is embedded 
also in Baron-Cohen’s (1994, 1995) shared intentionality detector, but since shared 
intentionality is just one aspect of communicative agency, the account presented here provides 
more detailed predictions about the detection of communicative agency. Communicative 
intentionality is a special kind of “aboutness”: The agent’s intention is directing the observer’s 
attention toward a referent of communication. According to Sperber and Wilson (1995), 
human communication has two layers of intention: The informative intention is to make some 
content manifest to another person. The communicative intention is to reveal to this person 
that one has this informative intention. To this end, a communicator draws an addressee’s 
attention to his informative intention. If the addressee realizes the communicator’s 
informative intention, she directs her attention to the relevant information (i.e., the referent of 
communication). According to Sperber and Wilson, this is a case of ostension – of “showing 
someone something” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; p. 49). Ostensive behavior directs the 
addressee’s attention to a phenomenon indicated by the communicator because – as Sperber 
and Wilson put it – “ostension comes with a tacit guarantee of relevance” (p. 49). Thus, the 
addressee is willing to direct attention toward the referent of communication because the 
behavior produced by the communicator indicates information that is of relevance to the 
addressee. Communication is therefore ostensive-inferential: The communicator produces a 
stimulus which marks the communicator’s informative intention. The recognition of this 
stimulus is important for the detection of relevant information. Even if the informative content 
can often be discovered without recognizing the informative intention of the communicator, 
detection of the stimulus is a more efficient way of deriving the informative content. The 
detection of these communicative intentions is especially relevant in learning situations in 
which information is provided which otherwise would be difficult or impossible to obtain, for 
example, if the situation involves new artifacts or actions that are “cognitively opaque”, or / 
and if generic knowledge has to be acquired (Csibra & Gergely, 2009). Given that within the 
first months of their lives infants are provided with new experiences in almost every situation, 
- 16 - 
 
the ability to acquire generic information is an issue from early on. This bears the problem 
that even if infants cannot infer the informative content of communication, they need to detect 
situations in which relevant information is provided and be able to adapt their behavior and 
attention in a way that allows them to process this information. According to Csibra & 
Gergely’s natural pedagogy hypothesis (Csibra & Gergely, 2009), infants are prepared to 
acquire relevant knowledge through a special, innate system that is activated in situations in 
which a communicator provides the infant with specific cues marking the communicator’s 
communicative intention to the infant. Communicative agency, in this sense, can be inferred 
from the referential behavior of an intentional agent that addresses a change in the epistemic 
contents of the addressee's mental representations (Gergely, 2011). Similar to modularist 
accounts, Csibra & Gergely (2009) propose an innate system that is triggered by certain 
communicative cues. Referring to Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) notion of ostension, Csibra 
and Gergely (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Gergely, Egyed, & Király, 2007) proposed that the key 
to infants’ capability of recognizing communicative intentions are ostensive cues - behaviors 
in the communicator that indicate that relevant information is provided, which are prewired in 
the infants to trigger the natural pedagogy system. Thus, the perception of these cues triggers 
a referential scope of the communicative act – an assumption that this situation offers new, 
relevant, and generic  information about the referent indicated by the communicator (Csibra & 
Gergely, 2009). In sum, this theory predicts agency perception on the basis of communicative 
(i.e., ostensive) cues. Sensitivity to these cues is supposed to be present from birth on.  
2.2 A classification of Agency-Cues 
All these theories on agency perception in early infancy make predictions about 
behavioral cues of an entity that result in agency-attributions in infants. Simulationist 
accounts restrict agency attributions in infancy to human (or humanoid) agents. However, 
recent neurophysiological studies in adults suggest that the perception of biological motion 
might tap into similar simulation processes, which broadens the range of potential cues for 
agency. Agency-cues derived from simulationist accounts are featural cues that reveal 
information about an agent’s identity, specifically, about its humanness. These cues involve 
morphology as well as biomechanical movement patterns. Study I of this thesis involves 
stimuli that can be discriminated on the basis of these featural cues.  
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Modularist theories assume that the category of agents is a broader one than that of 
humans; thus, the identification of a human being is not necessary for agency attributions. 
According to these accounts, categorization of an entity as an agent is achieved on the basis of 
mechanical and causal events the entity is involved in. Agency cues derived from this account 
therefore involve dynamic properties of objects indicating self-propelledness and context-
dependent movement. Thus, both simulationist and modularist theories make predictions 
about dynamic cues, in different regards. Biomechanical movement belongs to the class of 
featural cues, while dynamic cues in a broader sense include the movement of inanimate 
object eliciting animacy and agency attributions. Dynamic cues play a role in Study I as well 
as Study II of this thesis.  
Finally, the theory on communicative agency postulates that agency is also revealed by 
an entity’s communicative and referential stance toward another entity. According to this 
view, ostensive cues are the key to attribution of communicative agency. Ostensive cues are 
addressed in Study III of this thesis. 
Biro and colleagues (Biro et al., 2007) classified agency-cues with respect to their 
types and the level of categorization and interpretation hypothesized to be elicited by these 
types of cues. Table 1 refers to and extends this classification with a focus on the agency cues 
investigated in this thesis and their respective theoretical origins. In the following sections, 
empirical findings on cue-based agency attribution are reviewed with respect to these four 
classes of cues. 
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Table 1. Classification of agency-cues (adapted and extended from Biro, Csibra, & Gergely, 2007) 
investigated in this thesis  
Type of cue featural  dynamic  ostensive 
Cues investigated in 
thesis 
human morphology 








Type of agent (level 
of interpretation) 
Human agent (identity) 





Theory Simulationist Modularist Communicative 
Study I I, II III 
 
2.2.1 Featural cues 
Simulationists have proposed human features to be necessary for the attribution of 
agency. For example, Meltzoff (1995) found 18-month-olds to produce target actions of failed 
attempts in an imitation task if they had observed a human model, but not if they had 
observed a mechanical device perform the attempts. In her classical habituation study, 
Woodward (1998) found 9-month-olds to encode action goals only for human grasping 
actions and not if the same action was performed by a mechanical agent. Poulin-Dubois and 
colleagues (Poulin-Dubois, Lepage, & Ferland, 1996) demonstrated that 12-month-old infants 
consider humans, but not robots to be capable of showing self-propelled movement. While 
recent research has clearly demonstrated that infants’ attributions of agency and goals are not 
restricted to humans (Biro & Leslie, 2007; Csibra, 2008; Hofer, Hauf, & Aschersleben, 2005; 
Luo, 2011), the studies mentioned above do indicate that human features and human 
movement are cues to agency. The latter is inseparably tied to biological movement, which is 
by itself reliably associated with animacy and agency. Biological movement is easily detected 
in point light displays (PLD; Johansson, 1973). The perception of movement as biological is 
linked to brain areas (e.g., the superior temporal sulcus and the medial prefrontal cortex) also 
involved in action simulation (Blakemore & Decety, 2001). Adults readily detect movement 
direction from biological PLD (Chang & Troje, 2008), and this directional information 
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triggers reflexive orienting toward the movement direction (Shi, Weng, He, & Jiang, 2010). 
Biological PLD suffice for the identification of intentions: For example, a recent study 
demonstrates that adults can anticipate the goal of a manual grasping action presented as a 
PLD automatically and independently from recognizing the stimulus (Elsner, Falck-Ytter, & 
Gredebäck, 2012). Thus, adult studies suggest that the perception of biological motion which 
is contained in all human movements is closely linked to the interpretation of others’ actions 
and intentions. But also newborns can discriminate biological from non-biological motion and 
show preference for upright presentations of biological PLD (Bardi, Regolin, & Simion, 2011; 
Simion, Regolin, & Bulf, 2008). Evidence from electrophysiological studies suggests that the 
perception of biological motion recruits the same brain areas as in adults (Reid, Hoehl, & 
Striano, 2006). Recent studies also indicate that 6-month-olds are able to detect the walking 
direction of a point-light-walker (Kuhlmeier, Troje, & Lee, 2010) and, at the age of twelve 
months, to follow the directional orientation of a biological point light person turning toward 
a target (Yoon & Johnson, 2009). These few infant studies demonstrate that infants’ early 
sensitivity toward human and biological motion patterns is the basis for more complex 
interpretational processes that are related to agency.  
2.2.2 Dynamic cues 
Dynamic information as an agency cue (other than the special case of biomechanical 
movement) derives from modularist theories of agency perception: Certain types of 
movement serve as triggering input to ToBy (Leslie, 1994; 1995) and ID (Baron-Cohen, 1994; 
1995), resulting in different levels of agency attribution. Movement is one of the most 
obvious cues to agency: Almost every agent we encounter in the world moves around at some 
time. In fact, agency attribution on the basis of dynamic information has been claimed to be a 
universal phenomenon of human cognition (Barrett, Todd, Miller, & Blythe, 2005). Although 
lacking the synchronous biomechanical movement of body parts, inanimate dynamic objects 
can elicit the impression of “animacy”. Animacy and agency are distinct categories, but for 
some reasons it seems appropriate to summarize findings on “animate” and “agentive” motion 
together. First, Baron-Cohen (1994, 1995) explicitly does not distinguish between the two 
regarding their function as inputs for the agency-subsystem ID. Second, studies on the 
perception of animate movement often assess verbal reports of participants rating the 
presented stimuli as “alive”, which can be interpreted as a spontaneous and common-sense 
description of stimuli displaying behavior that falls into the theoretical account of agency. 
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Finally, movement types labeled as “animate” or “agentive” share a certain characteristic, 
namely self-propulsion, which is a fundamental cue to agency and will be discussed further 
below.  
Movement of single objects 
Adult studies show that a single object can create the impression of being alive, based 
solely on its pattern of movement. Tremoulet and Feldman (2000) reported that short, simple 
motion paths containing a simultaneous change in speed and direction, in the absence of any 
visible features that might explain this behavior change, elicited animacy ratings in adult 
participants. Perceived animate motion of geometrical objects appears to capture attention 
more than motion which is perceived as inanimate (Pratt, Radulescu, Guo, & Abrams, 2010) 
and activates brain areas also associated with the processing of biological movement (Schultz, 
Friston, O’Doherty, Wolpert, & Frith, 2005). Santos and colleagues (Santos, David, Bente, & 
Vogeley, 2008) investigated the movement parameters leading to animacy judgments more 
closely and found variations in directionality, discontinuity, and responsiveness to another 
object to elicit animacy ratings in adults. Their study also suggested that this interpretation 
occurs rapidly, after stimulus presentations as short as 200 ms. The authors concluded that 
perceiving an entity as animate is a rapid process which can be triggered by only small 
changes in motion parameters. A recent study suggests that a single dot “mimicking” natural 
movement, like the flying pattern of a fly, evokes animacy perceptions in adult participants 
(Schultz & Bülthoff, 2013).  
Most of the movement characteristics eliciting animacy ratings in adults can be 
subsumed under Premack’s notion of self-propulsion, or autonomous movement - the ability 
to “both move and stop moving without assistance from another object” (Premack, 1990). The 
critical feature of self-propelled objects is the capacity of initiating change (from rest to 
motion, or in speed). According to Premack, these movement features are detected early in 
infancy and result in perception of intentionality. Thus, the attribution of intention is a hard-
wired interpretational process which is triggered by the mere perceptual input of self-
propulsion - independent from the identity of the object. Studies on the influence of self-
propulsion on reasoning about physical properties or events have demonstrated that infants 
endow self-propelled objects with an own source of energy. For example, 5-month-olds 
showed recovery from habituation if an inert, but not if a self-propelled object changed 
direction of movement spontaneously, remained stable when released in midair, or 
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disappeared behind a screen (Luo, Kaufman, & Baillargeon, 2009). At about the same age, 
self-propelled, non-rigid, “biomechanical” object movement can be linked to goal-
directedness (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Luo, 2011; Schlottmann & Ray, 2010) and later on, 
even to mentalizing abilities (Surian & Geraci, 2012).  These studies provide evidence that 
even inanimate objects, such as geometrical shapes, are attributed agency if they exhibit 
agentive, namely self-propelled, movement characteristics. One recent electrophysiological 
study demonstrates that 9-month-olds discriminate animate from inanimate motion based on 
motion alone (Kaduk, Elsner, & Reid, 2013); however, direct behavioral evidence for agency 
attributions on the basis of context-free, self-propelled movement is difficult to obtain. 
Whereas adult studies can assess verbal judgments regarding attribution of mental states on 
the basis of movement alone, studies with preverbal infants need to infer these kinds of 
attributions for example from the infant’s ability to relate an object’s movement to a visible 
goal.  
Context-sensitive movement 
Gelman, Durgin, and Kaufman (1995) argued that movement alone is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the identification of novel agents. Perceptual cues, such as 
movement, are often ambiguous and contextual information has to be taken into account, for 
example an object’s approach to a goal or its interaction with other objects.  
Contingency  
Contingency as a cue to agency can be defined as “a cause and effect relationship 
between the behavior of an agent and that of another or between the behavior of an agent and 
that of some event in the environment” (Barrett, 2005 p. 206). In their classical study, Heider 
and Simmel (1944) showed contingent movement of three animated geometrical forms. Adult 
participants who observed this scene reported vivid impressions of interactions and 
relationships between the objects. But also minimal variation of the environment in which an 
object moves around can evoke agency attributions in participants. For example, participants 
in a study by Dittrich and Lea (1994) perceived an inanimate object’s movement as more or 
less animate depending on its movement speed relative to other objects. Tremoulet and 
Feldman (2006) manipulated the location of a dot relative to an object’s movement trajectory. 
Depending on where the dot was located, the object was perceived as approaching the dot or 
retreating from it. Similar types of approach and responsiveness between two objects were 
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shown in a study by Santos and colleagues (2008). If one dynamic object stopped moving in 
the vicinity of another object for a certain period of time, this behavior was also interpreted as 
animate.  
These adult studies show that minimal context variations elicit agency attributions that 
are more elaborate than those resulting from the motion of single objects: The observed object 
seems to anticipate obstacles, to avoid a predator, or to approach and chase another object. 
Does this apply to infants as well? Premack stated that “if two self-propelled objects are 
related in a special way […] the infant perceives not only intentional movement but also one 
object as having the goal of affecting the other object” (Premack, 1990; p.1). Similarly, 
Mandler (1992) proposed that the contingency between the motion of two objects contributes 
to infants’ impression of animacy, especially contingency at a distance (instead of direct 
contact). Infants show early preference for contingent interactive object movement over 
independent movement (Rochat, Morgan, & Carpenter, 1997). 
Most studies on infants’ perception of contingent object movement events investigate 
infants’ attribution of causal agency. For example, Leslie and Keeble (1987) habituated 6-
month-olds to a simple spatiotemporal event involving two objects. In the direct launching 
event, the first object moved toward the other, made contact, and the second object 
immediately started moving. In the delayed reaction event, the second object started 
movement after a temporal delay. If the direct launching event was reversed, infants showed 
more dishabituation than in the delayed reaction event, thus indicating that the infants had 
interpreted the event in terms of causal roles of the objects. Schlottman, Ray, and Surian 
(2012) demonstrated that infants of the same age group also interpret events as causal that do 
not involve direct contact of the objects (reaction events). In a recent study, 6-month-olds 
were familiarized with videos of an inanimate object (agent) orienting contingently toward 
another object and causing this object to move without contact. In test trials, the agent was 
displayed statically. Infants showed longer “anticipatory waiting” (i.e., the amount of time it 
took participants to stop fixating the object and move attention elsewhere), if they had 
observed the agent move autonomously – indicating that they expected the inanimate agent to 
continue moving (Hernik, Fearon, & Csibra, 2013). This finding indicates that, on the basis of 
autonomous movement that is contingently directed toward another object and “causes” 
another object’s movement, infants are able to construe an inanimate object as agentive.  
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Goal-directed movement 
One special case of context-dependent behavioral changes is goal-directed movement 
(Opfer, 2002). Infants’ ability to infer the goal of an observed action has been extensively 
studied in the past 15 years by the use of habituation procedures (e.g., Király, Jovanovic, 
Prinz, Aschersleben, & Gergely, 2003; Sommerville et al., 2005; Woodward, 1998) or 
paradigms assessing proactive, goal-directed eye movements (e.g., Cannon & Woodward, 
2012; Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006; Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011). This 
research yielded converging evidence that at least by six months, infants are able to interpret 
observed actions in terms of goals, or even “obsessed” (Csibra & Gergely, 2007) with doing 
so.. This ability appears to be such a fundamental “bias” in early social cognition that infants 
even apply it to actions they observe in nonhuman agents. For example, Gergely, Nadasdy, 
Csibra, & Biro (1995) habituated 12-month-olds to a display in which a ball repeatedly 
approached a goal location. The infants in this study were able to relate the efficiency of the 
ball’s movement path to an environmental constraint (an obstacle) relative to its goal. Similar 
results were found for 9-month-olds by Csibra and colleagues (Csibra, Gergely, Biro, Koos, & 
Brockbank, 1999). Kamewari and colleagues (Kamewari, Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hiraki, 
2005) reported that 6.5-month-olds would attribute a goal to a humanoid robot if the robot 
displayed “rational” behavior in reaching an action goal – that is, if it adapted its goal-directed 
movement to the absence or presence of an object in an efficient manner. Applying the same 
paradigm, Csibra (2008) found goal-attribution in the same age group even to a box if it 
showed variability within a range of efficient movement paths to reach a goal. More studies 
finding goal-attribution to box-like objects were conducted by Luo (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; 
Luo, 2009; Luo, 2011). Applying the Woodward-Paradigm (Woodward, 1998), Luo and 
Baillargeon (2005) habituated six-month-olds to a box repeatedly approaching one of two 
objects. In test events locations of objects were swapped and the box approached either the 
same object on a different path or a different object on the same path as in the habituation 
phase. Infants dishabituated only to events involving a new goal, indicating that they had 
established a relationship between the box and a specific goal object. Recently, Luo (2009) 
reported the same effects in three-month-olds.  
In sum, by the age of about 6 months, infants take into account the agent’s action in 
relation to its context – both in its interaction with other agents or in its behavior toward 
environmental objects and constraints. This capability extends to nonhuman agents. Adult 
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studies suggest that these context-dependent movement cues can trigger more conceptual 
interpretation, and recent research indicates that this might enable an infant to maintain an 
agency attribution even in absence of movement (Hernik et al., 2013). This also indicates that 
context-dependent behavioral changes, especially goal-directed movements are agency cues 
that involve more interpretation than, for example, the self-propelled movements of a single 
object.  
2.2.3 Ostensive cues 
Agency cues that presumably don’t require any conceptual evaluation but trigger 
innate mechanism are ostensive cues. Ostensive cues derive from Gergely and Csibra’s 
(Gergely, 2011; Csibra, 2010) account of communicative agency and include eye contact, 
infant-directed speech, and contingent reactivity (Csibra, 2010). Infants’ responsiveness to 
gaze and voice is well established, therefore these two cues were chosen for the purposes of 
this thesis.  
Sensitivity to human gaze has been claimed to be innate in humans (Baron Cohen, 
1994, 1995). Studies with very young infants support this hypothesis: Newborns spend more 
time looking at pictures of faces with open eyes as opposed to faces with closed eyes (Batki, 
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Connellan, & Ahluwalia, 2000) and gaze direction is processed 
by infants from their first days of life on (Farroni, Csibra, Simion, & Johnson, 2002; Vecera & 
Johnson, 1995). At three months of age, infants modulate their own communicative 
engagement and emotional expressions depending on the gaze direction of their adult 
interaction partner (Hains & Muir, 1996; Symons, Hains, & Muir, 1998). More importantly, 
infants show early sensitivity to the referential nature of gaze – a fact which is reflected in the 
early emerging and rapidly developing ability to gaze-follow (e.g., D’Entremont, Hains, & 
Muir, 1997; Moore & Corkum, 1998; Scaife & Bruner, 1975). By 18 months of age, infants 
can rely on gaze direction independent from head orientation (Moore & Corkum, 1998) and if 
targets are presented close to the infant’s midline, even 3- to 6-month-olds show gaze-
following in response to an adult’s head turn (D’Entremont et al., 1997). Indirect evidence 
that infants link gaze direction with a referent object was reported by Senju, Gergely, and 
Johnson (2008). In their study nine-month-olds showed increased looking times toward a 
centrally presented face if gaze was shifted to a location congruent with a previous object 
location. Results were interpreted to reflect infants’ sensitivity to the relation between gaze 
- 25 - 
 
direction and target object. Moreover, in a study by Csibra and Volein (2008), 8-month-olds 
were able to infer the location of a hidden object from the direction of the experimenter’s 
gaze.  
These findings indicate that gaze direction evokes referential expectations in infants 
which results in orienting toward the location of a referent and facilitates processing of the 
referent’s properties. But even without a visible referent, eye gaze provides directional 
information that is processed rapidly and involuntarily. Applying a spatial cueing paradigm, 
Hood and colleagues (Hood, Willen, & Driver, 1998) demonstrated that the gaze direction of 
a digitized human face triggered attentional orientation in 3-month-old infants toward the 
location indicated by the adult’s gaze direction. Farroni and colleagues (Farroni, Johnson, 
Brockbank, & Simion, 2000) demonstrated that this effect was dependent on the availability 
of dynamic information – the infants had to observe an apparent gaze shift in order to 
modulate their own attention. With this kind of dynamic information available, gaze cueing 
effects can be observed even in newborns (Farroni, Massaccesi, Pividori, & Johnson, 2004). 
Orienting one’s own attention according to the gaze direction of a communication partner 
prepares the infant for the acquisition of new information: Attentional orientation toward the 
direction of another person’s gaze facilitates encoding of the gazed-at object in 4-month-olds 
(e.g., Reid, Striano, Kaufman, & Johnson, 2004; Reid & Striano, 2005).  
In sum, gaze direction is a powerful communicative cue that engages and directs 
infants’ attention from early on, thereby preparing them for better processing of the referent 
object of communication. It is important to note that all the studies reviewed above used real 
or naturalistic stimuli, so little is known whether infants tie their attentional modulation to an 
agent’s identity. Some studies indicate that at around 8 to 12 months of age, infants show gaze 
following toward unfamiliar and even faceless objects if these show contingent interactive 
behavior with the infant or the experimenter (Deligianni, Senju, Gergely, & Csibra, 2011; 
Johnson, Slaughter, & Carey 1998). Meltzoff and colleagues (Meltzoff, Brooks, Shon, & Rao, 
2010) found similar behavior in 18-month-olds with a communicative robot. However, some 
authors propose that humanness together with gaze is necessary for 12-month-olds to link 
gaze to an object (Okumura, Kanakogi, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Itakura, 2013), to encode its 
properties (Okumura, Kanakogi, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Itakura, 2013b), or to link a label to the 
object (O’Connell, Poulin-Dubois, Demke, & Guay, 2009). To my knowledge, no study 
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applying a spatial cueing paradigm has investigated gaze cueing in infants with nonhuman, 
unfamiliar objects.  
Another communicative signal infants show early sensitivity to is the human voice. 
Even neonates show a preference for speech-signals over non-speech acoustic signals 
(Vouloumanos & Werker, 2004). Voice transmits emotional signals and guides infants’ 
behavior in social referencing situations (Mumme, Fernald, & Herrera, 1996; Vaish & Striano, 
2004). Especially Infant Directed Speech (IDS), a speech pattern universally used to address 
infants, characterized by higher pitch, shorter utterances, and longer pauses (Grieser & Kuhl, 
1988), raises infants’ attention in their first months of life (Cooper & Aslin, 1990; Fernald, 
1985) and guides their preference toward the speaker (Schachner & Hannon, 2011). Although 
voice does not reveal directional information as gaze does, a recent study indicates that the 
human voice helps to perceive directional information from referential gestures (Daum, Ulber, 
& Gredebäck, 2013). Vocal cues also seem to enhance object processing: In a visual joint 
attention task, 13-month-olds showed longer looking times toward a novel toy in the test trial, 
if the “old” toy had been cued vocally in familiarization trials. These results indicate that the 
infants had processed the toy which was cued by the voice (Parise, Cleveland, Costabile, & 
Striano, 2007). Together these studies demonstrate that, similar to eye gaze, the human voice 
captures infants’ attention and prepares them for learning. However, little is known to which 
extent voice helps to perceive an unfamiliar, inanimate agent as communicative and 
referential. The presence of either of these ostensive cues appears to evoke referential 
expectations in infants – for example, Senju and Csibra (2008) found 6-month-olds to follow 
an adult’s gaze toward a visible object if (and only if) either direct gaze or IDS were present.  
Most communicative situations provide infants with simultaneous stimulation from 
cues from different modalities. Several studies have addressed the question how infants 
process communicative signals from gaze and voice simultaneously. For example, two-
month-olds have been shown to match vowel information from voice and face (Patterson & 
Werker, 2003). Gliga and Csibra (2009) found that 13-month-olds interpreted a pointing 
gesture and IDS as co-referential and expected an object to appear in pointing direction only if 
the pointing person simultaneously refered to the toy in IDS. Similarly, Daum, Ulber and 
Gredebäck (2013) demonstrated that 12-month-olds showed shifts of attention toward a target 
cued by a pointing gesture only if the gesture was accompanied by additional communicative 
and referential speech. The more human and communicative the acoustic stimulus was, the 
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stronger the cueing effect was. Recent studies applying electrophysiological measures indicate 
an early synchronous processing of auditory and visual communicative at a neuronal level 
(e.g., Grossmann, Parise, & Friederici, 2010; Parise, Handl, Palumbo, & Friederici, 2011). 
Interestingly, Parise and Csibra (2013) found ostensive signals from visual and auditory 
modalities to elicit overlapping electrophysiological activity in 5-month-olds. However, the 
combination of both types of signals elicited the same amount of activation as either of them – 
the authors interpreted that, at a neuronal level, the simultaneous perception of two 
communicative cues is not processed as “more” communicative.  
The three classes of agency cues reviewed above potentially elicit different “qualities” 
of agency attributions. According to the classification of agency cues in Table 1, human 
morphology and biomechanical movement evoke featural agency attribution, whereas 
dynamic information without context evokes physical agency attributions. Context-dependent 
movement can elicit attributions exceeding mere agency because they allow interpretations of 
behavior as goal-directed. In contrast to these two classes of cues, ostensive cues trigger 
referential expectations. The next section describes a method for the assessment of attentional 
processes which I assume accompanies agency detection on the basis of these cues. 
2.3 What’s in a cue? Methodological considerations 
So far, I have reviewed theories on agency perception and different classes of cues that 
are hypothesized to serve as a triggering input for agency detection. According to Barrett 
(2005), the detection of agents and their discrimination from nonagents precedes higher order 
cognitions, such as the attribution of mental states. I have argued that operations on this basic 
level of the Agency System should be reflected in certain changes of attentional states, 
because the organism responds to a stimulus that is of vital importance to it. The reactions 
accompanying the detection of an agent may be very general – a startle, increased alertness, or 
positive arousal – these are all unspecific adaptations of an organism to a new, relevant object 
appearing within sight. But what distinguishes agents from non-agents in their psychological 
relevance to the observer is the fact that they are “about” something (Lycan, 1999).  
So in principal, the empirical question to be investigated is: Do we have access to this 
aboutness? Precisely, do infants have access to it? Certainly, we do not always have access to 
an agent’s intentions, but agents are also “about” their environment, they move toward 
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locations in space, they refer to objects in the perceptual array, and they orient their perceptual 
organs toward the observer or toward locations in space. This spatial directedness is one 
perceptually available cue to an agent’s “aboutness”. Therefore, attentional processes 
accompanying the detection of an agent should reflect the detection of its direction of 
orientation. The spatial cueing paradigm provides an appropriate method for measuring this 
attentional modulation following the perception of directional cues.  
2.3.1 Assessing the perception of directional information 
In an environment overwhelmingly abundant of sensory input, the ability to select 
relevant information is vital to any kind of organism. The ability to direct, or orient, attention 
has been described by Posner (1980) as the “aligning of attention with a source of sensory 
input or an internal semantic structure stored in memory” (Posner, 1980; p.4). This alignment 
can occur overtly – observable via head turns or gaze shifts – or covertly, in absence of these 
visible indicators. In both cases, orienting results in better and more efficient detection of a 
stimulus the organism is aligning its attention with. For the investigation of covert orienting, 
Posner (1980) introduced the spatial cueing paradigm. The standard variant of this paradigm 
assesses participants’ reaction times upon the appearance of a target stimulus at a peripheral 
position of the screen. Preceding the target, a cue stimulus is presented for a short time 
interval at a location congruent or opposite of the target location. Throughout presentation, 
participants keep their eyes fixated on a central location of the screen. Reaction times (RTs) 
toward targets appearing at a cued (i.e., congruent, or valid) location are faster compared to 
RTs toward targets appearing at uncued (i.e., incongruent, invalid) locations. Because eyes 
remain fixated at a central location, this cueing effect is argued to reflect shifts of covert 
attention toward the location of the cue that later facilitate orienting toward the congruent 
target. Apart from target location, reaction times are also influenced by the stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA): With increasing SOA, the facilitation effect for cued targets is diminished 
and longer RTs on congruent targets are observed (inhibition of return [IOR]; e.g., Posner and 
Cohen, 1984). 
In a variation of the spatial cueing paradigm, a central (as opposed to a peripheral) cue 
is presented which is spatially not predictive of the location of target appearance but contains 
directional information, such as an arrow (e.g., Friesen, Ristic, & Kingstone, 2004). Cueing 
effects have also been observed for social cues containing directional information, such as eye 
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gaze (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Langdon & Smith, 2005; Langton, Watt, 
& Bruce, 2000; Senju & Hasegawa, 2005). Whether covert orienting following these kinds of 
central cues is endogenous (i.e., under voluntary control) as opposed to peripheral cueing 
which is assumed to occur exogenously (i.e., reflexive) has been an issue of debate (see 
Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007). Recent studies argue that beliefs about the identity of the 
cue (Ristic & Kingstone, 2005) and attributions of perception and mental states to the cue 
(Teufel, Alexis, Clayton, & Davis, 2010; Wiese, Wykowska, Zwickel, & Mueller, 2012) 
modulate orienting following the social attention of others in a top-down fashion. Studies 
using central grasping (Daum & Gredebäck, 2011a; Fischer, Prinz, & Lotz, 2008) and 
pointing cues (Daum & Gredebäck, 2011a) demonstrate that adults infer directional 
information even from these referential or action-related stimuli.  
2.3.2 Spatial cueing in infancy 
Spatial cueing paradigms have been adapted for infancy research by the assessment of 
eye movement and gaze latencies upon target appearance (e.g., Johnson, Posner, & Rothbarth, 
1991). This technique allows the investigation of cognitive processes at an age where 
behavioral measures and even measures depending on open eye movements, such as gaze 
following and anticipatory gaze shifts, are still difficult to obtain. Spatial cueing paradigms 
further provide access to attentional processes occurring temporally much earlier than, for 
example, those reflected in measures of visual habituation and dishabituation. Gaze cueing 
effects are found in early infancy, provided the infant can observe the movement of the pupils 
(Farroni et al., 2000, 2004; Hood et al., 1998). Infants at the age of seven months show 
reliable cueing effects according to the direction of a statically presented grasping hand 
(Daum & Gredebäck, 2011b). One-year-olds shift their attention according to the direction 
implied in a pointing hand (Daum et al., 2013). Again, if the pointing is dynamic, this effect 
occurs much earlier (Rohlfing, Longo, & Bertenthal, 2012).  
In sum, the application of spatial cueing paradigms allows insight into attentional 
processes accompanying the perception of social and action-related stimuli in early infancy. It 
provides a tool for the investigation of cognitive processes occurring immediately upon 
stimulus presentation, independent of behavioral measures or other measures of visual 
attention requiring longer evaluation of stimuli configurations, such as visual habituation or 
anticipatory eye movements. On the basis of the inferences made from both adult and infant 
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studies applying this paradigm, the assumptions which motivated the application of spatial 
cueing procedures were that (1) spatial cueing effects reflect directional orientation and (2) 
this directional orientation is hypothesized to be the processing of socially relevant stimuli, 
for example the expectation of a referent object or an action goal. Thus, this paradigm seems 
to be adequate for the investigation of attentional processes accompanying agency detection. 
All studies presented in this thesis therefore used variations of the spatial cueing paradigm. 
Stimuli were presented as videos or still frames on a Tobii 1750 near-infrared eye tracker with 
an infant add-on. Measures of visuospatial attention assessed were the latencies of gaze 
arrival (i.e., reaction times) toward target stimuli (Study I, Study II, Study III). Study III 
additionally assessed looking times toward the cue stimulus. A detailed description of the 
respective method is provided in each study. The following chapter describes general research 
questions motivating the own studies and provides a summary of the findings. 
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3. Experimental Studies 
This thesis was motivated by the interest in investigating infants’ ability to infer 
directional or referential information from the agency cues reviewed above. Three groups of 
agency cues (featural cues, dynamic cues and ostensive cues) were derived from current 
theories of agency perception in infancy, and ample empirical findings reviewed in section 2.1 
of this thesis demonstrate that infants use these cues to attribute agency. It was hypothesized 
that agency detection on the basis of these cues should be reflected in certain modulations of 
visuospatial attention reflecting the perception of directionality and reference (see section 
2.3.1.). This leads to three research questions motivating the individual studies: 
(1) Do infants infer directional orientation during the observation of dynamic agency 
cues? 
(2) Do infants infer directional information from a static object after observing it engage 
in context-sensitive behavioral changes? 
(3) Do infants infer referential information from communicative agency-cues? 
The investigation of these questions was operationalized by applying variations of the spatial 
cueing paradigm. The following section summarizes the results of the three individual studies.    
3.1 Human features and self-propelled movement (Study I) 
The first study combined two types of agency cues – a featural and a dynamic cue – 
that originate from different theoretical accounts. Featural cues (in the case of this study, the 
natural movement of a grasping human hand) are derived from simulationist accounts. 
Dynamic cues (in the case of this study, the movement of a single object) are derived from 
modularist accounts. While sensitivity to human features is proposed to be present at birth on 
the basis of simulation (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1997), detection of agency on the basis of a 
single object emerges at around 6 months of age (Leslie, 1994; 1995). Each of these claims 
has received empirical support. Study I addressed the question (1) if the human movement 
elicits directional orientation and (2) if a single, inanimate object would evoke the same 
modulation of visual attention if it showed self-propelled movement. I assumed that both 
human movement and self-propelled object movement, but not linear object movement, 
would elicit cueing effects for targets appearing at a movement-congruent location, indicating 
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that infants had inferred directional information from these two agency cues. In addition, 5-
month-olds should respond to directional information from human, but not from object 
movement. Previous studies (Daum & Gredebäck, 2011b) indicated that 7-month-olds are 
sensitive to directional information contained in the morphology of a grasping hand even 
without dynamic information. Therefore, a third question motivating the experimental 
conditions in this study was to investigate whether these two different directional cues 
(grasping hand, self-propelled movement) were processed equally by this age group.  
The cues (a grasping hand or an inanimate object) were presented in a spatial cueing 
paradigm. Gaze latencies toward target stimuli appearing at a location congruent or 
incongruent with the cue’s movement direction were assessed. Both 5- and 7-month-olds 
showed a cueing effect for congruent targets if they observed the forward movement of a 
human hand. A geometrical object moving on the same trajectory as the hand and therefore 
exhibiting some of the hand’s movement characteristics indicating self-propelled movement 
(e.g., slight changes in speed and direction) elicited a cueing effect in 7-month-olds only. 
Seven-month-olds further showed no cueing effect, but allover increased reaction times in a 
condition where the hand was moved backwards on its initial trajectory.  
These results demonstrate that while 5-month-olds need human movement to infer 
directional information, 7-month-olds can infer this information from object movement as 
long as it contains self-propelled movement characteristics. This directional information is 
processed similar to the directional information contained in the morphology of a grasping 
hand.  
3.2 Dynamic cues: Contingent, self-propelled movement (Study II) 
The second study aimed at investigating whether 7-month-olds would be able to infer 
directional information from the static display of an unfamiliar agent after observing this 
agent exhibit contingent, self-propelled movement toward a goal. The cue used in this study 
therefore exhibited two dynamic cues (self-propelledness and movement in context) that were 
derived from modularist theories. According to these theories, infants in the investigated age 
group should be able to infer directional information. This hypothesis was further 
strengthened by the results of a previous study indicating that infants of about the same age 
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interpret a similar dynamic scene as goal-directed and maintain this attribution even during 
static displays of the cue (Hernik et al., 2013).  
Infants were familiarized with a scene in which an animated object moved across the 
screen, changed direction contingent with the appearance of another object and moved toward 
the object, causing the object to move. Depending on the experimental condition, the agent’s 
movement was either autonomous or guided by elements in the center of the screen. In spatial 
cueing trials, the agent was displayed statically. I expected that on the basis of the agent’s 
autonomous, contingent and goal-directed behavior in familiarization trials, infants would be 
able to make more elaborate agency attributions and maintain this attribution even in absence 
of the dynamic information.  
Results showed that only infants who had observed the autonomous movement of the 
agent showed a cueing effect for targets at locations congruent to the agent’s front. In a 
baseline condition where infants were familiarized with a different dynamic event without the 
agent, infants showed increased latencies of gaze arrival toward targets. Thus, the 7-month-
olds in this study were able to maintain agency attributions even without direct perceptual 
information from movement and infer directional information from the agent’s orientation.  
3.3 Ostensive cues: gaze and voice (Study III) 
The third study investigated how two ostensive agency cues modulate 7-month-olds’ 
attention during the observation of the rotating movement of a geometrical object. Ostensive 
cues were derived from a current theory of communicative agency reported in section 2.1. 
Sensitivity to ostensive cues is proposed to be innate. However, little research exists on the 
perception of these cues in inanimate, dynamic objects. The presence of (schematic) eye gaze 
and infant-directed speech during the rotating movement of an inanimate object was varied 
and capturing and disengagement of attention were assessed. On the basis of previous 
research on gaze and voice perception reviewed above, I expected infants in both voice and 
gaze conditions to show increased visual attention toward the stimulus. I further asked 
whether the movement of the inanimate object, together with ostensive cues, would be 
perceived as referential and therefore elicit disengagement and orienting of attention.  
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Results indicated that both voice and gaze conditions elicited increased attentional 
engagement toward the stimulus independent from the existence of the respective other. 
Surprisingly, no cueing effect was observed in gaze conditions, but allover faster latencies of 
gaze arrival toward targets irrespective of target location occurred in the voice condition, 
indicating faster attentional disengagement from the stimulus. These findings demonstrate that 
communicative agency cues capture attention toward novel agents. They further indicate that 
the perception of voice elicits an undirected expectation of a referent of communication and 
plays a role in directing infants’ attention toward the location of a potential referent of 
communication. However, these results indicate that perception of “reference” seems to be 
impaired if the agent is not human.   
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4. Discussion of own findings 
The main interest motivating the studies presented in this thesis was to investigate 
whether infants can infer directional information from objects exhibiting behavioral cues 
hypothesized to elicit agency attributions in infancy. There is ample evidence that infants are 
able to construe objects as agentive on the basis of their behavior. Studies addressing this 
question rely on measures that require the evaluation of an action in terms of a (visible) action 
goal. However, given the vital importance of immediate detection of agency, I proposed that 
these attributions should be observable much earlier in the modulation of visuospatial 
attention, even in the absence of a visible goal object. Barrett’s Agency System (Barrett, 2005) 
provides a model for the cognitive processes involved in the interpretation of agentive 
behavior. On the first level of his model, Barrett proposes the detection of agents on the basis 
of perceptual cues, which results in higher level interpretation processes. I referred to this first 
level and argued that agency detection should be measurable immediately upon the encounter 
with a potential agent. More precisely, I claimed that agency cues would evoke changes in 
orienting as well as attentional engagement and disengagement as a result of the infant 
inferring directional or referential information from these behavioral cues. To investigate this 
assumption, different types of agency cues were derived from current theories of agency 
perception: featural cues (human morphology, biomechanical movement), dynamic (self-
propelled movement, movement in context), and ostensive cues (eye gaze, voice). In three 
studies, objects exhibiting one or more of these agency cues were presented in spatial cueing 
paradigms.  
Study I showed that younger infants need featural information (i.e., human 
morphology and movement) whereas older infants respond to dynamic, nonhuman agency 
cues as well. For the younger infants, motion had to be embedded in a human stimulus to 
perceive it as directed, but older infants independently used directional information contained 
in the a human hand as well as in the movement of a self-propelled, inanimate object. 
Simulationist accounts propose that responsiveness to human features and movement is 
innate. Study I supports this assumption by showing that directional information of the 
movement of human hands can be inferred at an earlier age than directional information of the 
movement of inanimate objects. This early sensitivity to human movement has been 
demonstrated in studies on the perception of biological movement (e.g., Bardi, Regolin, & 
Simion, 2011; Simion, Regolin, & Bulf, 2008) and presumably reflects an evolutionary 
- 36 - 
 
adaptation to the fact that human agents play the most important role in our lives from birth 
on. Results for the inanimate object movement in our study are in line with Leslie’s (1994) 
assumption on the functionality of the ToBy module which enables infants to interpret 
dynamic invents with respect to their source of energy; he proposes this mechanism to be 
functional at about 6 months of age.  
Can we conclude that infants at the age of 5 month cannot detect agents on the basis of 
self-propelled movement? For example, Premack (1990) proposed an innate sensitivity to 
these movement patterns. Moreover, earlier studies have shown that already 5-month-olds 
discriminate between self-propelled and inert object movement (Luo et al., 2009). The key to 
the fact that the 5-month-olds did not infer directional information in our study might lie in 
the minimal differences of movement patterns in the self-propelled and linear movement 
condition. One result that speaks for this interpretation is a marginal cueing effect in 7-month-
olds in the linear condition. Since the linear object movement contained one minimal cue to 
self-propulsion (cue presentation always started with a still frame, see Study I for a more 
detailed description of the stimuli), this may have evoked agency attributions in some infants. 
Infants’ ability to detect self-propelled movement and to infer directional information from it 
might therefore be a matter of adequate stimulation. Thus, even if 5-month-olds already have 
the capacity to detect agents on the basis of dynamic information, this capacity is still 
developing and depends on the quality and distinctness of this information. If, on the one 
hand, results imply that the detection of self-propelledness is a matter of adequate stimulation, 
then even infants younger than seven months of age should benefit from self-propelledness 
with more distinct movement characteristics. Future studies might address this issue by 
varying movement patterns of inanimate objects (similar to Santos et al., 2008; Tremoulet & 
Feldman, 2000). If, on the other hand, 5-month-olds infer directional information only on the 
basis of simulation, this should also be the case for biological movement independent from 
human morphology, for example in a PLD of a grasping hand. To conclude, Study I offered 
first evidence that detection of agents occurs rapidly, within brief periods of stimulus 
exposure and on the basis of minimal variations in perceptual information. The sensitivity to 
agency cues serving as an input to this rapid detection seems to rapidly develop between 5 
and 7 months of age.  
Study II showed that 7-month-olds can categorize inanimate objects as agents on the 
basis of these agency cues within brief exposure times and maintain this categorization even 
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in absence of these behavioral cues. These findings extend those from Study I by showing that 
infants at this age respond to self-propelled inanimate movement in context. Infants in Study 
II established a relationship between the agent’s direction of orientation and context 
information (e.g., an action goal), and this relationship presumably enabled them to infer 
direction of orientation even in absence of dynamic information in a top-down manner.  
What kind of relationship did infants form? Did they attribute perception, that is, a 
looking-direction to the agent? Did they establish and maintain a representation of the agent’s 
goal? Or did they perceive the agent as directional in a more general sense – with a capacity 
to act upon the environment (i.e., did they establish a causal agency attribution)? These 
different levels of interpretation correspond with different assumptions regarding the source 
of directional information eliciting the infants’ orienting of attention. If infants attributed 
“perception” to the agent, their orienting in congruence with the agent’s “front” would be 
comparable to a type of joint attention with an agent’s line of regard – cueing effects for gaze 
direction have been interpreted as reflexive joint attention (e.g., Frischen et al., 2007). If the 
agent was perceived as animate – and adult studies show that context information increases 
animacy attributions (e.g., Tremoulet & Feldman, 2006) – the agent’s frontal features might 
have been interpreted as sensory organs. However, this rather mentalistic interpretation would 
require further research and experimental procedures that go beyond spatial cueing paradigms 
– for example, measuring infants’ expectation of the agent’s behavior depending on its visual 
access to a target object. The second interpretation would imply that the type of directional 
information modulating infants’ attention reflected an expectation of the goal object to 
reappear in the agent’s “front” – an expectation which is however likely to decline over the 
time course of the experiment.  
I would argue that the self-propelled, goal-directed movement lead the infants to 
endow the agent with a general capacity to act causally upon its environment – irrespective of 
the presence of a goal object. This would imply that the infants’ attentional modulation was 
caused by their attribution of a more general direction of causation which does not necessarily 
imply the attribution of perception or mental states. To conclude, this study demonstrates that 
context-information together with self-propelled movement elicits stable attributions of 
directedness for inanimate objects that are easily retrieved at the age of 7 months.  
Study III showed that visual (gaze) and auditory (voice) communicative cues altered 
infants’ attention during the observation of an inanimate agent. Whereas the presence of either 
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ostensive cue elicited increased attention toward the stimulus, only voice resulted in 
facilitation of attentional disengagement and seemed to play a greater role in attentional 
orientation. These findings suggest that attentional modulation during the observation of 
agents is influenced by various cognitive processes, for example an expectation of relevance 
proposed to be elicited in communicative situations (Csibra & Gergely, 2009). Expectations of 
relevant and referential information prepare the infant to interact with and learn from others. 
This notion of agency detection and associated attentional modulation goes beyond what was 
investigated in Study I and Study II: Communicative agency is directed at the infant and 
“prompts” the infant to engage in joint attention toward a referent object. The preparedness 
for communicative encounters is an evolutionary advantage, because it allows acquisition of 
cultural knowledge from conspecifics. This fact might also explain the finding from Study III 
that naturalistic stimuli seem to be especially important, or even mandatory, for the perception 
of communicative agency. Although theories on communicative agency make no prediction 
about the kind of agent necessary for agency perception, Study III also indicates that the 
modulation of visual attention through referential information is exclusive for human 
ostensive cues. Moreover, infants in Study III were more likely to infer directional 
information from a dynamic stimulus in combination with an auditory human stimulus. This 
finding suggests that intersensory stimulation might facilitate attentional orienting. One 
interesting question for future research arising from these findings is: In which modalities is 
agency perceived by infants? Baron-Cohen (1994; 1995) claims that the ID receives input 
from any modality, including touch. For example, do infants respond to “agentive” sounds 
displayed by a novel morphological ambiguous object (such as sniffing, or sounds of human 
and animal movement)? Research on agency perception mostly involves visual stimuli only, 
but it is likely that other sensory organs are also “tuned” to agency detection.  
Returning to the initial motivation for the studies presented here, I conclude that 
perceptual cues hypothesized to elicit agency attributions in infancy have a modulating effect 
on different measures of visuospatial attention. These changes reflect infants’ ability to rapidly 
detect agents and modulate their attention in response to directional and referential 
information from objects exhibiting these cues. Referring to Barrett’s (2005) Agency System, 
a basic assumption guiding this thesis is that this detection occurs rapidly upon encounters 
with potential agents and is a prerequisite for subsequent inferences about an agent’s mental 
state. A consequence of the detection is the orienting of attention according to directional and 
referential information perceived from the agent’s behavior. This modulation of visuospatial 
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attention prepares the organism to adapt behavior to encounters with predators, prey, or 
partners of social interaction. The application of the spatial cueing paradigm offers a new 
method to make these early cognitive processes visible. The possible cognitive processes, 
which influence the assessed attentional modulation, range from mere featural-based 
categorization (Study I), identification of physical and causal agency (Study I, Study II), the 
relation of an agent to a goal (Study II), and the perception of reference (Study III). This also 
implies that both “low-level” perceptual input as well as more elaborate attributions of goal-
directedness can evoke this attentional modulation. 
To conclude, infants’ sensitivity toward agentive behavior is reflected in their 
attentional responses when they are confronted with subtle behavioral cues to agency. This 
behavior indicates that the observation of both low-level perceptual stimulus properties as 
well as more complex behavior enables humans to quickly adapt to encounters with beings 
that are guided by mental states and therefore are potentially “friend or foe”. These 
capabilities seem to be functional from early on in life. 
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From integrated to independent use of directional information: The development of covert 








Covert shifts of attention reflect directional understanding both in adults and infants. 
Movement has been shown to facilitate covert orienting of attention in infants (Farroni, 
Johnson, Brockbank, & Simion, 2000). In a series of four experiments, we investigated how 
covert orienting of attention in infancy is modulated by dynamic stimuli. Experiment 1 
demonstrated that 5-month-olds as well as 7-month-olds covertly orient their attention into the 
direction of a dynamically grasping human hand. Experiment 2 showed that 7-month-olds 
orient their covert attention into the direction of a geometrical shape moving on the trajectory 
of the grasping movement, but 5-month-olds do not. Experiment 3 showed, that mere linear 
translating object movement does not elicit covert orienting of attention in 7-month-olds. In 
Experiment 4, we found that 7-month-olds process both grasping direction and movement 
direction, which resulted in increased reaction times when both directional cues were 
presented in a conflicting manner. These findings suggest that covert orienting of attention 
reflects early detection of goal-directed agents during action observation. Five-month-olds 
need the information of both movement and grasping direction, while 7-month-olds can use 
both directional cues in isolation. 
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5.1.1 Introduction 
It is well understood that infants form expectations about the behavior of other people 
from early on. One of the most fundamental skills for the interaction with other human beings 
is the ability to interpret behavior as intentional and directed towards goals. Infants ascribe 
goal-directedness to humans (e.g., Daum, Prinz, & Aschersleben, 2008; Woodward, 1998) 
and, under certain conditions, even nonhuman agents (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Schlottmann 
& Ray, 2010; Shimizu & Johnson, 2004). One widely applied method to assess perception of 
goal-directedness to human or nonhuman agents in preverbal infants is the measuring of 
anticipatory eye movements. These predictive eye movements towards an agent’s goal before 
the action is competed have been reported in infants at the age of 12 months and younger 
(Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010; Hunnius & 
Bekkering, 2010; Kanakogi & Itakura, 2011; Kochukhova & Gredebäck, 2010). However, 
less is known about the cognitive processes that take place temporally before these overt 
attentional shifts are observable. Before visually searching for an agent’s potential goal, the 
infant has to identify a stimulus as being directed towards a location in space. In this paper we 
argue that, once an infant identifies an agent that is directed towards a goal or a location in 
space, her attention is modulated in the direction of the spatial location the stimulus is 
directed at. This covert shift of attention occurs even before overt, goal-directed eye 
movements are observable. 
Several studies have demonstrated that social and action-related stimuli elicit covert 
orienting in infants younger than 12 months of age. All of these studies applied adaptations of 
a classical spatial cueing paradigm first introduced by Posner (1980). A centrally displayed 
stimulus (cue) is followed by the presentation of a peripheral stimulus (target). If an observer 
identifies the directionality of a stimulus (e.g., an arrow), his or her covert attention is 
modulated in the direction of the stimulus resulting in shorter reaction times upon the 
appearance of a target at a congruent location (in direction of the cue) compared to an 
incongruent location (opposite direction). This facilitation of reaction times is henceforth 
referred to as cueing effect. In adults, not only abstract cues such as arrows but also more 
socially relevant stimuli such as gaze shifts, grasping and pointing actions reliably evoke this 
cueing effect (Daum & Gredebäck, 2011a; Driver et al., 1999; Fischer, Prinz, & Lotz, 2008; 
Langdon & Smith, 2005). Covert orienting of attention has been observed in infants as young 
as four months (Johnson, Posner, & Rothbart, 1994). Its emergence has been linked to the 
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development of parietal brain structures (e.g. Johnson, Posner, & Rothbart, 1991). However, 
studies investigating covert orienting with social or action-related stimuli are still scarce. In a 
study of Hood, Willen, and Driver (1998), 3-month-old infants observed a face in which the 
eyes blinked and gazed towards a peripheral position. Latencies of gaze arrival were faster for 
targets appearing at a gaze-congruent than at a gaze-incongruent position. Daum and 
Gredebäck (2011b) investigated covert orienting triggered by observed grasping actions. In 
this study, 3-, 5-, and 7-month-olds were presented a central picture of a stationary grasping 
hand followed by a peripheral target object at a location congruent or incongruent to the 
grasping direction of the hand.  Saccadic Reaction times (SRTs) upon target appearance were 
assessed via eye tracking. Seven-month-olds showed shorter SRTs on congruent targets. 
However, in 5-month-olds, this cueing effect was not present in the mean reaction times. 
Further, findings by Daum, Ulber, and Gredebäck (2013) suggests that, around 12 months, 
infants covertly shift attention following the perception of pointing hands. These results show 
that that around 7 months, infants quickly infer goal-directedness from a familiar human 
stimulus even if it is displayed static.  
Additionally, recent studies suggest that young infants infer the directedness from the 
movement of objects. The importance of perceived motion regarding spatial cueing was 
highlighted by a study conducted by Farroni and colleagues (Farroni et al., 2000). They tested 
infants from 16 to 21 weeks using the same stimuli as Hood and colleagues (1998). Instead of 
the pupils, the entire face was displaced laterally with the pupils remaining fixed. In trials in 
which the target appeared at a location congruent to the movement direction of the head, 
infants reacted faster upon target appearance than in incongruent trials. In a second 
experiment, apparent movement of the pupils was avoided. No congruence effect was 
observed in this experiment. This study suggests that the perceived direction of movement can 
account for the results obtained by Hood and colleagues (1998).  
In a study by Rohlfing, Longo & Bertenthal (2012), infants were presented with a 
centrally depicted hand performing a horizontal pointing movement and then moving back to 
its central starting position. Infants of 4.5 and 6.5 months oriented faster toward targets 
appearing in pointing direction than to targets appearing opposite to the direction of the 
pointing movement. However, this congruence effect was observed in neither age group if the 
pointing hand remained stationary. In a further manipulation, Rohlfing et al. varied the initial 
movement direction of the pointing hand: In the forward condition, the initial movement was 
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congruent with the pointing direction. In the backward condition, movement and pointing 
direction were incompatible. Interestingly, infants only showed faster reaction times upon 
(pointing-) congruent targets in the forward condition. These results suggest that in fact, 
movement is a necessary factor for younger infants to modulate their covert attention. At the 
same time, movement alone was not sufficient conflicted with the directional information of 
the pointing finger.  
From these findings, we assume two factors to elicit covert orienting of attention: the 
directional information contained in a human hand that is grasping (grasping direction) 
towards or pointing at a location in space and the directional information contained in the 
movement direction. Based on these findings, the objectives of our study were threefold: First, 
we explored the role of movement for the modulation of covert attention during the 
observation of a dynamic human grasping action (Experiment 1). Secondly, we analyzed the 
quality of movement that is needed to elicit covert attentional shifts (Experiments 2 and 3). 
And finally, we investigated the relative impact of movement direction versus grasp-inherent 
direction in an age group that has been shown to be sensitive to both types of information 
(Experiment 4). These four Experiments promote our understanding of attentional processes 
that occur during action observation in infancy. 
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5.1.2 Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we studied 5- and 7-month-olds’ orientation of covert attention in 
direction of a dynamic, natural grasping movement. A modified spatial cueing paradigm 
(Posner, 1980) was applied. A human hand moved unfolding to a full grasp, from the 
periphery to the center of the screen. Before disappearing, the hand had reached a maximum 
aperture, similar to the static picture of a grasping hand used by Daum and Gredebäck 
(2011b). The cue was followed by a target presented at a location at the periphery of the 
screen, randomly congruent or incongruent to the movement and grasping direction. Areas of 
interest (AOI) were defined for cue and targets. In all experiments, the AOIs around the object 
were the same size. Reaction times, measured as the latency of gaze arrival on the target AOI 
after target appearance, were assessed via eye tracking. Since a static grasping hand elicited a 
robust cueing effect in 7-montholds in the study by Daum and Gredebäck (2011b), we 
expected to observe the same kind of effect with a dynamic grasping hand not only in the 7-
month-olds, but also in the 5-month-olds in our study.    
Method 
Participants 
Eighteen infants at the age of 5 months (7 male, mean age = 151.28 d, SD = 9.13 d) 
and 7-month-old infants (8 male, M = 217.44 d, SD = 3.12 d) participated in Experiment 1. 
Eight 5-month-olds were tested but excluded from further analysis because they did not reach 
a minimum of six valid trials. Six more 7-month-olds were tested but excluded because they 
did not reach a minimum of six valid trials (n = 3), because their mean RT on congruent or 
incongruent trials deviated more than 3 SD from the group mean (n = 2), or due to distraction 
by the parent during testing (n = 1). All infants tested in the entire study were healthy, born 
full-term (37-42 weeks gestation) and with normal birth weight (>2500 g). Their families’ 
addresses were obtained from municipal birth records. For participation, families received a 
small gift appropriate to the infant’s age and a certificate. All parents gave informed consent 
prior to the study. The study was approved by the local ethics committee and conducted in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
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Test environment, stimuli and apparatus 
The laboratory was unfurnished except for the test equipment. The infants were seated 
in a car safety seat (Maxi Cosi Cabrio), which was placed in front of the eye tracker. Stimuli 
were presented using the software ClearView (Version 2.7.1; Tobii Technology, Sweden) on a 
Tobii 1750 near-infrared eye tracker with an infant add-on (precision: 1 visual degrees, 
accuracy: 0.5 visual degrees, sampling rate: 50 Hz). A 9-point infant calibration was used. 
During calibration, a blue and white sphere expanded and contracted (extended diameter = 3.3 
visual degrees) in accompanied by a sound. The viewing distance to the monitor was 
approximately 60 cm. 
Each trial began with a picture of a colorful toy looming in the center of the screen 
accompanied by a sound (attention grabber). As soon as the infant fixated the central stimulus, 
the experimenter started each trial manually, the attention grabber disappeared and the cue 
stimulus was presented. The cue moved from a horizontal peripheral position towards the 
center of the screen and disappeared. In Experiment 1, the cue was a video clip of a human 
hand that was closed to a fist in the beginning (4.5 x 3.9 visual degrees) and then performed a 
grasping movement to its maximum extension (6.1 x 5.4 visual degrees) toward the center of 
the screen. No other parts of wrist and arm were shown to ensure both equal distribution of 
visual information on the screen at the final position of the hand and similarity with stimuli 
used in previous studies (Daum & Gredebäck, 2011b; Hood et al., 1998; Rohlfing, Longo, & 
Bertenthal, 2012). The total duration of cue presentation was 2500 ms (500 ms still frame in 
the beginning and 2000 ms movement). After disappearance of the cue, a black screen was 
shown for an interval of 320 ms to ensure cessation of eye movements before target 
presentation. After this gap, the initial attention grabbing stimulus measuring 3.2 x 4.3 visual 
degrees (now referred to as the target) appeared at a horizontal peripheral location on the 
screen at a distance of 11.9 visual degrees from the last position of the cue at the center of the 
screen (Figure 2). The movement direction of the cue was not predictive of target location. 
Targets appeared equally often at the congruent or incongruent location. The appearance of 
the target was accompanied by a short version of the initial attention-grabbing sound played 
for 800 ms. The target remained visible until the infant looked at it or until 5000 ms had 
elapsed. Then a new trial began with a different centrally presented looming stimulus. 
The starting position of the cue, the order of the targets, the relation of the movement 
direction, and the location of the target were pseudo-randomized. In order to avoid adaptation 
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effects, not more than three repetitions of cue direction, target location, or cue-target relation 
were allowed. The maximum number of trials presented was 64. The infants were randomly 
assigned to one of four different orders. 
Procedure 
Infants were tested individually, accompanied by one parent. All infants were tested at 
a time of day when they were likely to be alert and in good mood. Before the experiment, 
infant and parents were escorted to a reception room. The infant was allowed to explore the 
new environment for about ten minutes while the research assistant described the test 
procedure to the parents and one of the parents signed a consent form. Then, the infant and 
one parent were brought to the test room. The research assistant helped the parent to position 
the infant in the car seat at a distance of approximately 60 cm from the monitor. During 
stimulus presentation, the parent sat on a chair behind the infant. Parents were advised not to 
interact verbally during testing or to comment on the videos presented to the infant. However, 
they were encouraged to comfort the infant by putting both hands close to the infant if 
necessary. The research assistant stayed in the lab during testing but was seated behind a 
screen, thus not visible for the infant. Before the video was displayed, a nine-point infant 
calibration was performed. The experiment lasted about 10 to 15 minutes depending on the 
number of trials the infant watched.  
Data Analysis 
Eyetracking data was analyzed using the software MatLab (MathWorks, version 7). 
The cue-start AOI (11.7 x 11.6 visual degrees) extended from the starting position of the cue 
to the position of the cue after 1000 ms of cue presentation with a tolerance of 50 pixels 
around the maximal cue extension. The cue-end AOI (11.7 x 12.8 visual degrees) was defined 
as the area around the last frame of the cue before disappearance with 50 pixel tolerance. The 
target AOI (6.9 x 9.4 visual degrees) was defined around the target position with 50 pixel 
tolerance. A trial was declared valid if the infant hat looked at least 200 ms at the cue-start 
AOI during the first 1000 ms of the cue presentation and 200 ms at the cue-end AOI during 
the last 500 ms of cue presentation. Infants had to have completed a minimum of 6 valid trials 
in order to be included in the final data analysis. The reaction time was defined as the duration 
between the appearance of the target and the arrival of the infant’s gaze in the respective 
target AOI (Gredebäck, Johnson, & von Hofsten, 2010). Individual RTs smaller than 100 ms 
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or deviating more than two standard deviations of each individual mean were excluded from 
analysis.  Further, infants with average RT on congruent or incongruent trials deviating more 
than 3 SD from the group average RT were excluded from the analysis. A 2 x 2 (Congruence 
[congruent, incongruent] x Age [5months, 7months]) repeated measurement analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) with Congruence as a within-subjects factor and Age Group as between-
subjects factor was performed over the dependent variable RT. In addition, the number of 
infants with shorter average RT on congruent trials was compared to the number of infants 
with shorter RT on incongruent trials using nonparametric tests (binomial). P-values are 
reported two-tailed. 
Results and Discussion 
The average number of valid trials was M = 18.83 (SD = 8.86; min = 6, max =38) for 
the 5-month-olds and M = 25.61 (SD = 14.23; min = 10, max = 59) for the 7-month-olds. Age 
groups did not differ in the amount of valid trials (p = .095). The ANOVA resulted in 
significant main effects of age group, F(1,34) = 15.251, p < .001, η2 = .310 and congruence, 
F(1,34) = 14.953, p < .001, η2 = .305, and a significant Age Group x Congruence interaction, 
F(1,34) = 5.140, p = .03. η2 = .131. Five-month-olds showed longer RT (M = 794.83 ms, SD = 
398.36 ms) than 7-month-olds (M = 418.42 ms, SD = 92.37 ms). Reaction times were shorter 
for congruent trials (M = 513.83 ms, SD = 279.68 ms) than for incongruent trials (M = 699.41 
ms, SD = 451.05 ms). The interaction effect indicated that the difference between congruent 
and incongruent trials was larger in the group of 5-month-olds (Mcongr = 647.64 ms, SDcongr = 
344.14 ms; Mincongr = 942.01 ms, SDincongr = 523.05 ms; p = .005) than in the group of 7-
month-olds (Mcongr = 380.03 ms, SDcongr = 68.56 ms; Mincongr = 456.81 ms, SDincongr = 143.76 
ms; p = .022; see Figure 4). The results of the parametric analysis were further supported by 
two nonparametric analyses of the number of infants showing a cueing effect (i.e., shifting 
their gaze faster to the target in congruent than in incongruent trials) and the number of 
infants showing an opposite cueing effect. Fifteen of 18 infants in the group of 5-month-olds 
showed shorter RT on congruent than on incongruent trials. A binomial nonparametric test 
showed that these frequencies differed significantly (p = .008). A similar pattern was observed 
in the group of 7-month-olds: Fourteen of 18 infants showed the cueing effect (p = .031). This 
finding demonstrates that, in addition to the grasping direction, the direction of movement is 
an important cue to perceive the direction of a goal-directed grasping action. While previous 
studies using static displays of a grasping hand had found robust covert orienting only at the 
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age of 7 months (Daum & Gredebäck, 2011b) the present findings indicate that, with available 
motion information, a robust cueing effect can be observed already at a younger age. This 
finding fits well with earlier studies investigating the role of motion in relation to the direction 
of gaze shifts (Farroni et al., 2000) and pointing (Rohlfing et al., 2012) in a similar age group. 
Furthermore, the present results replicate the finding that SRTs decrease throughout 
development (Bronson, 1982; Canfield et al., 1997; Daum & Gredebäck, 2011b; Gredebäck, 
Örnkloo, & Hofsten, 2006) due to a general increase in processing speed across development 
(Kail, 1991). However, Experiment 1 does not answer the question whether the facilitating 
effect of movement direction on covert orienting is specifically tied to the movement of a 
human hand or whether it more generally applies to a broader range of dynamic stimuli. 
Experiment 2 was designed to cast light on this issue. 
5.1.3 Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we tested the influence of the movement direction per se on the 
orienting of attention during the perception of a directional movement. Here, the quality of 
movement was identical as in Experiment 1, but a geometrical object (a rectangle) was 
presented instead of the grasping hand. With this manipulation, the dynamic information of 
the movement direction was isolated from the grasping direction. The geometrical object had 
the same spatial extensions and color as the hand used in Experiment 1 but beyond that did 
not contain any similar feature of the hand. The movement trajectory of the geometrical object 
was matched to the movement path of the grasping hand in Experiment 1. Accordingly, the 
movement of the inanimate geometrical object in Experiment 2 possessed some agentive 
movement features: It described a slightly irregular, curved trajectory and showed cues of 
self-propelledness (i.e. acceleration and slight changes in the movement trajectory). If 
movement direction alone accounts for the effects obtained in Experiment 1, then this 
inanimate, geometrical object moving on the same path as the grasping hand should elicit the 
same modulation of attention as the grasping hand.  
Method 
Participants 
A new sample of eighteen 5-month-olds (10 male, M =154.89 d, SD = 7.27 d) and 
eighteen 7-month-old infants (7 male, M = 214.00 d, SD = 8.18 d) was tested. Additional 28 
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infants (nineteen 5-month-olds and nine 7-month-olds) infants were tested but excluded from 
further analysis because they did not reach a minimum of six valid trials (5-month-olds: n =  
16, 7-month-olds: n = 6), or because of individual reaction times deviating more than 3 SD 
from the group mean (5-month-olds: n = 3,  7-month-olds: n = 3).  
Stimuli, procedure and data analysis 
Stimuli and procedure were identical to Experiment 1 with the following exception. 
Instead of the grasping hand, a rectangular geometrical shape was used as a cue (see Figure 
2). The object had approximately the same surface dimensions as the hand (6.6 x 2.7 visual 
degrees) as well as the hand’s mean luminance and color values. Still frames of the 
geometrical object were matched frame by frame onto the movement trajectory of the hand 
using the software Final Cut Pro 6 (Apple Inc., 2012). As in Experiment 1, the cue was 
presented stationary for 500 ms before it started to move towards the center of the screen. 
Thus, the movement of the object possessed the same movement qualities of the natural 
grasping movement such as minor irregularities and some acceleration. Data analysis was 
identical to Experiment 1.  
Results and Discussion 
Five-month-old infants completed an average of 48.11 (SD = 13.27; range = 28 to 64) 
trials out of which M = 16.83 were valid (SD = 7.74; range: 7 to 33). The 7-month-olds 
completed a total of M = 57.33 (SD = 12.55; range: 30 to 64) trials and M = 22.22 valid trials 
(SD = 10.47; range: 7 to 40). The average numbers of completed trials differed significantly 
between the age groups, t(34) = -2.143, p = .039, d = .07. The average numbers of valid trials 
did not differ significantly between age groups, t(34) = -1.756, p = .088. This smaller number 
of valid trials in the group of 5-month-olds resulted in a much higher drop-out rate compared 
to Experiment 1. These numbers might be an indicator that a majority of the younger infants 
had difficulties maintaining attention to the geometrical object compared to the familiar 
human hand in Experiment 1. We have no reason to assume that the stimulus was especially 
difficult to follow for the 5-month-olds – drop-out rates from Experiment 1 did not differ 
substantially between age groups which indicates that the general type of presentation, 
stimulus size and movement speed were adequate for both age groups. In contrast to the hand 
stimulus, the rectangle had no interesting surface features which might have caused the 
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younger infants to quickly lose interest in the object - testing in this age group often had to be 
aborted earlier than in the 7-month-olds.  
The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of age group, F(1, 34) = 13.687, p = 
.001, η2 = .287, but no significant effect for congruence, F(1, 34) = 0.411, p = .526, η2 = .012. 
Again, the there was a significant Age Group x Congruence interaction, F(1, 34) = 8.858, p = 
.005, η2 = .207. Five-month-olds showed overall longer RT (M = 530.92 ms, SD = 142.55 ms) 
than 7-month-olds (M = 393.3 ms, SD = 67.76 ms). The 7-month-olds showed a significant 
cueing effect with shorter RT for congruent trials (M = 355.60 ms, SD = 32.41 ms) compared 
to incongruent trials (M = 430.99 ms, SD = 123.45 ms, t (17) = -2.683, p = .016). Figure 4 
depicts average RT for congruent and incongruent targets in each age group. In contrast, 
marginally shorter RTs for incongruent targets were observed in the group of 5-month-olds 
(Mcongr = 589.32 ms, SDcongr = 247.22 ms; Mincongr = 472.53 ms, SDincongr = 99.69 ms; t (17) = 
2.009, p = .061). Thirteen of the 7-month-olds showed a cueing effect whereas 5 infants 
showed shorter RTs on incongruent targets, z = 1.650, p = .096. In the 5-month-olds, eleven 
infants showed a cueing effect compared to 7 infants showing the opposite cueing effect, z = 
0.707, p = .481 (binomial test).  
Results from this experiment demonstrate that a moving geometrical stimulus with the 
same movement characteristics as a natural human hand but without any further properties of 
human hands or other biological agents - such as the specific form of a grasping hand - is 
sufficient for 7-month-old infants to orient attention into the movement direction of a 
stimulus. In contrast, at the age of 5 months, this information is not yet sufficient; infants at 
this age did not show a cueing effect. This suggests that at the age of 5 months, infant do not 
yet infer directional information from movement direction alone but that they need further 
information about the identity of the stimulus. Although inanimate, the cue presented in 
Experiment 2 displayed some movement properties typical for self-propelled agents. It 
remains thus unclear whether the 7-month-olds relied on these specific cues when shifting 
their attention or whether any kind of movement, including linear movement would cause a 
similar shift of attention. Accordingly, the next question, addressed in Experiment 3, was 
whether mere linear movement of a geometrical object is sufficient for 7-month-olds to orient 
attention according to the perceived direction of movement.  
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5.1.4 Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was designed to test whether by the age of 7 months, infants’ orienting 
of attention can be modulated by the perception of linear movement, independent of 
biological or agentive movement characteristics. For this purpose, the geometrical object used 
in the previous Experiment was animated on a linear movement path without the agentive 
movement characteristics present in Experiment 2, that is, a curved movement path and an 
accelerated movement pattern. 
Method 
Participants 
In Experiment 3, a new sample of 18 7-month-old infants (9 male, M = 214.94 d, SD = 
5.38 d) was tested. Six additional infants were tested but were excluded from further analysis 
because they did not reach a minimum of six valid trials. 
Stimuli, procedure and data analysis 
Stimuli and procedure were the same as in Experiment 2, except that the geometrical 
object performed a linear movement on a horizontal movement trajectory at constant speed of 
6 visual degrees per second.  
Results and Discussion 
In Experiment 3, infants completed M = 59.78 (SD = 10.63; range: 27 to 64) trials out 
of which M = 22.56 (SD = 10.95; range: 6 to 36) were valid. Although average RTs on 
congruent trials (M = 404.7 ms, SD = 111.21 ms) were faster than on incongruent trials (M = 
526.66 ms, SD = 234.73 ms), this difference was marginal, t(17) = -1.996, p = .062. In 
addition, the number of infants showing shorter RT on congruent trials (n = 11) did not 
significantly differ from those showing shorter RT on incongruent trials (n = 7; z = 0.707, p = 
.481). This is a similar picture as in the 7-month-olds in Experiment 2; however, average RTs 
were longer in Experiment 3 (M = 465.68, SD = 130.11) than in Experiment 2 (M = 393.30, 
SD = 67.76), t(34) = 2.094, p = .046. On the one hand, this might be an indicator that the 
infants who saw the linear movement in Experiment 3 disengaged attention on average later 
from the cue. On the other hand, this value might also result from greater individual 
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differences in the encoding of the stimulus because of one aspect in the object’s trajectory that 
might have posed ambiguity about the quality of the movement to some infants. Recall that in 
all manipulations the cue was displayed as a still picture for 500 ms before starting to move 
toward the center. This procedure was chosen to give infants enough time to encode the 
properties of the stimulus before it was set in motion. Due to the high sensitivity of 
visuospatial attention to temporal manipulations, this procedure was kept constant across 
experiments. However, this type of presentation had the effect that even in the linear 
movement manipulation, the cue set itself in motion. Possibly, this minimal single cue of self-
propulsion - namely, a self-initiated start of movement - might have elicited agency attribution 
(Premack, 1990). In fact, the difference between the RT on incongruent and congruent targets 
varied greatly on an individual level, as indicated by a range between -165.00 ms and 810.67 
ms (M = 121.96 ms). At this point we conclude that at the age of 7 months, infants respond to 
both the directional information contained in static pictures of a grasping hand (Daum & 
Gredebäck, 2011b) as well as to a geometrical object containing agentive movement 
properties (Experiment 2). The shape of a static grasping human hand obviously contains 
directionality for 7-month-olds to orient attention. At the same time, the non-rigid movement 
pattern in Experiment 2 was sufficient to elicit orienting of attention in absence of the specific 
shape of the hand, but linear movement seems to be a borderline case. An obvious 
combination of the movement type (agentive/linear) and “agent” type (human hand / 
geometrical object) would be to present a linear forward movement of a grasping hand. 
However, keep in mind that 7-month-olds respond to grasping direction even in the absence 
of movement (Daum & Gredebäck, 2011b) – a condition like this would therefore not be 
likely to contribute an extension to existing data. Instead, our main interest from these 
findings was whether grasping direction and movement direction are equally strong 
directional cues for 7-month-olds. Consequently, the aim in Experiment 4 was to investigate 
which of these two types of information predominates in a situation where both directional 
cues – grasping direction and movement direction – are incongruent. 
5.1.5 Experiment 4 
To address the obvious question about the relative impact of the hand’s grasping 
direction on the one hand and the movement information on the other hand, these two kinds of 
directional information were presented simultaneously but in a conflicting manner: Similar to 
Experiment 1, a grasping human hand moved from a peripheral position towards the center of 
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this screen. Instead of the forward movement, the hand was moved backwards on the same 
movement trajectory as the grasping hand in Experiment 1 in a way that the direction of 
grasping aperture and movement were opposing. 
Method 
Participants 
A new sample of eighteen 7-month-old infants (5 male, M = 212.17 d, SD = 9.33 d) 
was tested. Four additional infants were tested but were excluded from further analysis 
because they did not reach a minimum of six valid trials. 
Stimuli, procedure and data analysis 
Stimuli and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1, except that the hand was 
performing a backward movement while opening to grasp. The movement was matched on 
the same trajectory as in Experiment 1. Thus, in this manipulation, the direction information 
as provided by the shape of the grasping hand and the direction information provided by the 
agentive movement were contradictory. This implied that a target appeared at a location that 
was congruent to the movement direction and at the same time incongruent to the grasping 
direction or that it appeared at a location that was congruent to the grasping direction and at 
the same time incongruent to the movement direction. For the sake of simplification, the 
labels “congruent” and “incongruent” refer to the target location in relation to the movement 
direction rather than in relation to the grasping direction.  
Results and discussion 
Infants completed an average of 27 (SD = 13.23; min = 7, max = 49) valid trials. No 
difference in the RTs was observed between congruent (M = 581.5 ms, SD = 277.96 ms) and 
incongruent (M = 575.86 ms, SD = 301.85 ms) trials, t(17) = 0.76 p = .940. The number of 
infants showing shorter RTs on congruent trials (n = 8) did not significantly differ from those 
showing shorter RTs on incongruent trials (n = 10; p = .815). Thus, neither movement nor 
grasping direction was predominant in this task. Additionally, the average RTs of Experiment 
4 where movement direction and grasping direction were opposing were greater (M = 578.68 
ms, SD = 243.81 ms) compared to those in Experiment 1, where grasping and movement 
direction were congruent (M = 418.42 ms, SD = 92.37 ms, see Figure 6). Thus, contradictory 
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information from movement and grasping direction resulted in allover increased average RT. 
This suggests that the directional information from grasping hands interfered with the 
information of movement direction.  
5.1.6 General Discussion 
In four experiments, we investigated how the perception of dynamic stimuli elicits 
covert orienting of attention in infants.  Previous studies had shown that, while 7-month-olds 
covertly orient in accordance with the grasping direction of a stationary display of a human 
hand (Daum & Gredebäck, 2011b) and 12-month-olds show comparable behavior with the 
static picture of a pointing hand, these effects have not reliably been observed in younger 
infants. The importance of perceived motion for covert orienting of attention in younger 
infants has been emphasized by earlier studies (Farroni et al., 2000; Rohlfing et al., 2012). 
The present study addressed the following three research questions: 1) To what extent does 
movement perception facilitate covert orienting of attention during action observation early in 
infancy? 2) What are the specific movement characteristics that elicit covert orienting of 
attention? And 3) What is the relative contribution of grasping direction and movement 
direction in the eliciting of covert orienting of attention in 7-month-olds? 
The results of Experiment 1 where infants were presented with a dynamic grasping 
hand demonstrate that already 5-month-olds are able to covertly orient attention in 
congruence with the grasping direction if they see a dynamic, instead of a static, human hand 
performing a grasping action. There are several possible reasons why a dynamic, stimulus 
enhances covert orienting of attention in younger infants. Firstly, infants show sensitivity for 
motion and preference for dynamic over static stimuli from early on (Aslin & Shea, 1990; 
Dannemiller & Freedland, 1989; Volkmann & Dobson, 1976). Movement helps infants to 
segregate figure from ground (Craton & Yonas, 1990), to perceive the spatial layout of a 
three-dimensional object (Arterberry & Yonas, 2000), and to complete partially occluded 
objects (Kellman & Spelke, 1983). These findings show that movement is a salient and 
important perceptual factor from early on as it helps infants to identify and process objects in 
the environment. This fact might have facilitated the processing of the observed grasping 
action in the 5-month-olds in our compared to earlier studies (Daum & Gredebäck, 2011b) 
using static displays. Secondly, perceived movement helps to discriminate animate from 
inanimate entities (Leslie, 1994; Premack, 1990). Already newborns distinguish biological 
- 72 - 
 
motion from other forms of motion (Simion, Regolin, & Bulf, 2008). Thus, movement not 
only captures attention early in life but also supports the identification of animacy and as a 
result, helps to evoke the attribution of goal-directedness. Finally, the observation of a natural 
grasping movement, rather than just a static display, might have facilitated the simulation of 
the observed action through activation of cortical regions referred to as the mirror neuron 
system (MNS; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). The MNS is assumed to be recruited during the 
observation of actions as well as during action execution and has been proposed to facilitate 
action understanding through motor simulation (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004). 
Similar neuronal correspondences between the perception and execution of actions have been 
suggested to exist in infants as young as nine months (Southgate, Johnson, Osborne, & 
Csibra, 2009). Adult studies indicate that the observation of moving body facilitates the 
recruitment of the MNS (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). Since five-month-olds’ grasping 
skills are just emerging, their motor simulation of the observed grasping action might have 
been facilitated by the dynamics of the naturally moving hand. 
Experiment 2 was designed to test whether infants at the age of 5 and 7 month covertly 
orient attention into the movement direction of an inanimate, geometrical object moving on 
the same trajectory as the grasping hand in Experiment1. In line with prior studies (Farroni et 
al., 2000), results obtained in Experiment 1 had suggested that movement perception is a 
necessary prerequisite for the covert orienting of attention in infants at around 5 months.  
However, at this young age, the beneficial effect of perceived movement was only 
present when the dynamic cue was a human hand, thus, the information about movement 
direction and grasping direction was available. No cueing effect was observed in the 5-month-
olds in Experiment 2. One possible reason that only the 7-month-olds showed a cueing effect 
in Experiment 2 is that they were sensitive to some specific movement qualities of the 
geometrical object: By moving on the same trajectory as the hand in Experiment 1, the object 
displayed some of the hands’ typical movement properties, i.e. a curved, accelerating, non-
rigid movement. This behavior corresponds with what is generally referred to as self-
propulsion, (Premack, 1990) a type of movement behavior characterized by autonomous 
changes in direction, which result in a nonlinear movement trajectory. It is well established 
that self-propulsion plays a crucial role in the detection of agents  (Baron-Cohen, 1997; 
Mandler, 1992; Premack, 1990). Infants make inferences from self-propulsion to goal-
directedness and vice versa (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005). For this effect, neither a human agent 
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nor biological motion are necessary. Csibra (2008), for example, demonstrated that 7-month-
old infants attribute goal-directedness to a self-moving box if the box shows some variation in 
its movement path. Luo (2011) found similar effects in even younger infants. Schlottmann and 
Ray (2010) presented 6-month-olds with a rectangular shape that performed a schematic 
caterpillar-like movement by contracting and extending along its horizontal axis. Infants in 
their study ascribed action goals to this self-propelled but inanimate form. Schlottmann and 
Ray labeled this type of movement “schematic biomechanical motion”  - a movement type 
associated with the movement of animals without being embedded in the morphology or form 
of an animal. In this sense, the movement of our geometrical object in Experiment 2 could as 
well be described as a type of schematic biomechanical motion: While lacking the typical 
concerted movement of joints and limbs, the object still moved in an irregular, non-rigid 
fashion that exceeds the notion of mere self-propelledness. In sum, from about six months of 
age, infants ascribe goal-directedness even to unfamiliar, faceless or geometrical objects, as 
long as these show agentive movement, and orient their attention in congruence with the 
object’s movement direction. 
However, the line between the perception of movement as goal-directed or non-
directed appears to be thin. Experiment 3 tested for the possibility that a linear translating 
movement of a geometrical shape is sufficient to elicit covert orienting of attention in 7-
month-olds. Infants in Experiment 3 did not show a significant cueing effect. Accordingly, it 
is not the perception of movement per se that modulates the covert orienting of attention in 7-
month-olds. When no movement features characteristic for self-propelled objects were 
available, 7-month-old infants did not attribute goal-directedness to moving objects. However, 
on a mere descriptive level, the 7-month-olds did show a tendency to orient faster to 
congruent targets. One might speculate that a possible reason for this tendency was the fact 
that in all manipulations, the stimulus’ movement began after a still frame of 500ms 
displaying the stimulus’ initial position. Thus, one single cue of self-propulsion – self initiated 
movement – was present in all four experiments. This procedure was chosen to ensure equal 
timing in all conditions. If this potential animacy cue caused the descriptive difference 
between congruent and incongruent trials in Experiment 3, one might further speculate that 
the modulation of attention by a dynamic stimulus is a function of the quantity and quality of 
a stimulus’ agentive movement features. In fact, studies with adults have shown that the 
subjective impression of agency of an inanimate object can be induced by the qualitative 
variation of its movement behavior (Santos, David, Bente, & Vogeley, 2008; Tremoulet & 
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Feldman, 2000). Biro and Leslie (2007) showed that infants as young as 6 month attribute 
goals to a nonhuman actor as long as enough behavioral cues are available. In their study, the 
amount of available agency cues infants needed to attribute goal-directedness decreased with 
age.  
So far, we can conclude that 7-month-olds are able to rely on two different types of 
information when orienting attention: Grasping direction of a human hand (Daum & 
Gredebäck, 2011b) and directional information from agentive movement (current study). In 
fact, Experiment 4, where grasping direction and movement direction were presented in a 
conflicting manner, suggests that the 7-month-olds process these two types of directional 
information simultaneously, if they are presented in a conflicting manner. This processing of 
conflicting information presumably results in an interference effect (similar to Stroop, 1935), 
which is reflected in the increased reaction times in Experiment 4. Interference effects for 
directional information have been found in adults before (with directional words and gestures; 
Langton, O’Malley, & Bruce, 1996). In our study, infants had to have followed the movement 
of the objects with their eyes for a certain period of time in order to be included in the 
analysis. Thus, all infants in the analysis had paid attention to the movement direction of the 
backward moving hand. At the same time, the infants likewise attended to the grasping 
direction of the hand. Our data suggest that, at the age of 7 months, infants process both 
movement direction of a potential agent as well as the direction of a familiar agent. Infants of 
around 7 months have experience with hands as agents that are inextricably tied to goal-
directed action. At the same time, a sensory cue as movement seems to trigger agency 
attribution on a lower perceptual level. In this regard, covert orienting of attention in infants 
seems to be influenced by two factors discussed in prior literature on agency attribution: 
Perceptual cues and experience-based knowledge (Biro & Leslie, 2007). Future studies might 
investigate how categorical knowledge about agents on the one side and various perceptual 
agency cues on the other side influence covert orienting of attention in early infancy 
throughout development. As categories and concepts of agents are broadened, other familiar 
entities associated with goal-directedness might evoke covert orienting of attention. 
Furthermore, which perceptual (e.g. morphological) or behavioral (e.g. social) cues can elicit 
covert orienting of attention, even when displayed by novel agents? Studies like these will 
help to broaden our understanding of the quick and involuntary covert orienting of attention 
as a reflection of early detection of goal-directed agents. 
- 75 - 
 
To conclude, covert orienting of attention in infancy is triggered by two directional 
cues: The grasping direction of a human hand and certain types of movement behavior. Before 
the age of 7 months, infants need the integration of these two cues to orient in congruence 
with the grasping direction of the hand. At the age of 7 months, infants are able to use the 
different information in isolation.  
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Figure 3. Stimuli as used in Experiment 1-4. 
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Figure 4. Reaction times for congruent and incongruent targets in Experiment 1 as a function of age 
group. Error bars depict standard errors. 
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Figure 5. Reaction times for congruent and incongruent targets in Experiment 2 as a function of age 
group. Error bars depict standard errors. 
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Figure 6. Average reaction times in Experiment 1 (Hand forward) and Experiment 4 (Hand backward) in 
the group of 7-month-olds. Error bars depict standard errors. 
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Infants are sensitive toward agentive movement characteristics even of inanimate 
objects (Csibra, 2008; Hernik, Fearon, & Csibra, 2013; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Luo, 2011; 
Wronski & Daum, 2013). The present study investigates whether 7-month-old infants infer 
the direction of orientation from an inanimate agent after having observed it to engage in self-
propelled, context-sensitive movement. Infants were familiarized to the agent’s movement in 
two conditions. In the no-contact condition, the agent showed self-propelled, context-sensitive 
movement toward another object. In the contact condition, the agent’s movement was guided 
externally. In a following spatial cueing procedure, the agent was displayed static at the center 
of the screen. Gaze latencies were assessed for targets appearing at a location congruent or 
incongruent to the agent’s frontal feature. Only infants that had observed the agent move 
autonomously showed shorter gaze latencies for congruent compared to incongruent targets, 
suggesting facilitation of attention toward a location congruent with the agent’s directional 
orientation. Results provide evidence that infants infer direction of orientation from novel 
agents on the basis of behavioral agency cues. 
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5.2.1 Introduction 
The way an entity moves through space is closely tied to our categorization of it as 
being alive, to pursue goals, and to engage in social interaction. Self-propelled movement, a 
movement characteristic indicating an entity’s capability for autonomous changes in speed 
and direction (Premack, 1990), contributes to animacy perception to single geometrical shapes 
in adults (e.g., Santos, David, Bente, & Vogeley, 2008; Schultz & Bülthoff, 2013; Tremoulet 
& Feldman, 2000). Context-sensitive movement, such as goal-directed movement or 
movement that is in other ways contingent to other objects and environmental constraints 
elicits even stronger ratings of animacy, suggesting more elaborate interpretations of agency 
(Tremoulet & Feldman, 2006). Sensitivity to and preference for dynamic stimuli is present 
from early on (e.g., Volkmann & Dobson, 1976). Kinematic information helps infants to 
segregate figure from ground (Craton & Yonas, 1990), to encode object shape (Arterberry & 
Yonas, 1988), and even to categorize animals and vehicles in point light displays (Arterberry 
& Bornstein, 2001). Self-propelled movement has been hypothesized to elicit agency 
attributions in infants (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1995; Premack, 1990). In fact, infants 
identify goal-directed behavior of unfamiliar agents on the basis of self-propelled movement 
(Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Luo, 2011; Schlottmann & Ray, 2010) or other context-sensitive 
movement types, such as efficiency of movement in relation to environmental constraints 
(e.g., Csibra, Gergely, Biro, Koos, & Brockbank, 1999; Csibra, 2008). However, these studies 
on agentive motion perception apply paradigms that assess agency attribution via the 
evaluation of an object’s repeated goal approach (but see Biro, 2013, for an exception). Since 
agency, or intentionality, as a state of being directed upon something (Lycan, 1999) may, but 
must not, be revealed through the pursuit of goals that are obvious for the observer, we argue 
that this directedness is also accessible via the perception of an agent’s directedness toward a 
location in space. Given the vital importance of detecting an agent’s – that is, a potential 
predator’s, a prey’s, or a communicative partner’s – direction of orientation, this detection 
should result in immediate orientation of the observer’s own attention in the same direction, 
enabling the organism to quickly react to changes in the agent’s behavior, and to detect an 
action goal or a referent of communication. In the present study, we investigated infants’ 
capability of inferring direction of orientation from a novel agent after having observed it to 
show agentive movement patterns, and to orient their own attention accordingly.  
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Orienting of attention is commonly assessed by the application of spatial cueing 
paradigms originally introduced by Posner (1980). Posner demonstrated that reaction times to 
a target stimulus were facilitated if the target’s location was preceded by a cueing stimulus 
predicting the target’s location, even in the absence of overt eye movements (covert 
attention). In a variant of this spatial-cueing paradigm, nonpredictive cues containing 
symbolic (e.g., arrows) or social (e.g., eye gaze, pointing or grasping hands) directional 
information are presented at a central location (Daum & Gredebäck, 2011a; Driver et al., 
1999; Fischer, Prinz, & Lotz, 2008; Langdon & Smith, 2005). If this directional information 
is encoded, reaction times are faster upon targets appearing at a location congruent to the 
cue’s direction compared to incongruent targets (cueing effect). Covert orienting of attention 
emerges in the first four months of life as a result of the maturation of parietal brain structures 
(Johnson, Posner, & Rothbart, 1991, 1994), and adaptations of social cueing paradigms 
measuring gaze latencies to target locations have been successfully applied in infant studies 
(Daum & Gredebäck, 2011b; Daum, Ulber, & Gredebäck, 2013; Farroni, Massaccesi, 
Pividori, & Johnson, 2004; Hood, Willen, & Driver, 1998; Rohlfing, Longo, & Bertenthal, 
2012; Wronski & Daum, 2013). Spatial-cueing paradigms offer several advantages to infant 
studies: They can be applied at very young age and they offer access to attentional processes 
that occur immediately upon the detection of a stimulus – without evaluation of context 
information. Spatial-cueing procedures have offered evidence for infants’ sensitivity toward 
directional information. For example, cueing effects have been found in 3-month-olds and 
even newborns following the gaze shift of a schematic human face (Farroni et al., 2004; Hood 
et al., 1998). At the age of seven months, infants show cueing effects in response to the 
direction of a static grasping hand (Daum & Gredebäck, 2011b), and, if observing a dynamic 
grasping action, 5-month-olds show this effect as well (Wronski & Daum, 2013). At 12 
months, infants orient attention into the direction of a static pointing hand (Daum et al., 
2013); again, if pointing is presented dynamically, this effect is found at an even younger age 
(Rohlfing et al., 2012). These findings indicate that infants have formed associations between 
the morphology of a familiar, human stimulus and its directedness through their experience 
with observing it in the context of referential or goal-directed actions, or through their own 
productive action experience. However, infants are not only sensitive to the directional 
information contained in familiar morphology of human gaze or hands but also to movement 
direction of an unfamiliar agent. In a study by Wronski and Daum (2013), 7-month-olds 
showed a cueing effect if they observed the movement of a box-shaped object. Crucially, this 
effect was only observed if the box showed agentive, that is, autonomous nonlinear 
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movement. It was argued that infants inferred the box’s directional orientation as a result of 
its agentive behavioral characteristics. Further, a recent study indicates that even 6-month-
olds identify the frontal orientation of an inanimate agent after having observed it to show 
context-sensitive agentive movement and expect it to continue moving when displayed static 
(Hernik et al., 2013). In sum, movement provides infants with important information about an 
agent’s relation to the environment. Even more, if sufficient behavioral cues are provided, 
infants readily attribute directional orientation to even unfamiliar agents.  
The present study was designed to investigate whether infants at the age of 7 months 
link the morphology of a novel, inanimate agent to its directional orientation after having 
observed it to engage in contingent and autonomous movement. To address this question, we 
applied a spatial cueing paradigm using stimuli similar to Hernik et al. (2013). Infants were 
familiarized to the movement of an object with distinctive front and back features. It was 
varied whether the objects’ movement was autonomous and contingently directed toward 
another object (i.e., agentive) or whether its movement was externally guided. Later, infants’ 
attentional shifts were assessed in spatial cueing task where the object was displayed 
stationary followed by a target that appeared congruent or incongruent with its previously 
observed movement direction. Additionally, a baseline condition without prior movement 
information was designed to assess how the availability of dynamic information changed 
infants’ attention toward the agent in general. On the basis of previous findings (Wronski & 
Daum, 2013; Hernik et al., 2013) we expected that infants that had seen the agentive object 
movement would attribute directional orientation to the agent even when static, indicated by 
facilitated gaze latencies toward a peripheral target in the direction of the agent’s “front”.  
5.2.2 Methods 
Participants 
A sample of 45 7-month-old infants (25 male, mean age: 208.64 d, SD = 10.6 d, range: 
41d) participated in the study. Additional 26 infants participated but were excluded from 
further analysis due to being fussy or inattentive (n = 12), lack of data or valid trials (n = 8), 
poor calibration data (n = 4), or because individual gaze latencies deviated from the group 
mean more than 3 SD (n = 2). Infants had to have watched a minimum of four familiarization 
trials and a minimum of six valid spatial cueing trials in order to be included in data analysis. 
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A spatial cueing trial was declared valid if the infant had looked at the cue for a minimum of 
100 ms and if the latency until gaze arrival on the target was greater than 100 ms.  
Materials 
Colorful videos of 3D-animated objects were presented with the software ClearView 
(Version 2.7.1; Tobii Technology, Sweden) on a Tobii 1750 near-infrared eye tracker with an 
infant add-on (precision: 1°, accuracy: 0.5°, sampling rate: 50 Hz). During familiarization 
trials, an animated novel agent moved on a green checkerboard background. The agent 
(length: 2 visual degrees, height: 4 visual degrees) was composed of a yellow truncated 
pyramid with a distinctive feature at each of its two shorter faces (see Figure 7). The agent 
moved at a constant speed of 1.62 visual degrees per second, with its shorter faces aligned 
with the movement path. It was manipulated between subjects, which of the two features 
faced forward. In the beginning of each familiarization trial, the agent moved on a linear path 
from a position at the bottom or top of the scene towards the center of the screen. As the agent 
reached the center of the screen, a blue ball entered the scene from a peripheral position on 
the opposite side of the display, accompanied by a sound. Contingent with the ball’s 
appearance, the agent changed its movement trajectory as if orienting towards the ball, and 
approached the ball until making contact with it. Upon contact, the blue ball reversed 
movement direction on the same path and rolled out of the scene, again followed the agent 
changing its movement trajectory and continuing leaving the scene on the same trajectory as 
the ball. Depending on the condition (contact, no-contact), the agent’s movement was either 
self-propelled or guided by elements in the center of the screen (Figure 7). Elements were 
present in both the contact and the no-contact condition but their function regarding the 
agent’s movement was varied between conditions. Additionally, we included a baseline 
condition in which the agent was not shown in familiarization trials. Instead, the blue ball 
performed the exact same movement pattern as the agent. This procedure was chosen to test 
whether having seen the agent in motion had a general effect on infants’ attention toward the 
agent during test trials. Fifteen infants were randomly assigned to each condition in a 
between-subjects design. The total duration of a familiarization film was 12.5 seconds. During 
test videos, the previously moving agent was displayed statically at the center of the screen, 
oriented horizontally with the respective front facing toward the right or left. After the 
presentation of the agent for 1,000 ms, the agent disappeared and the blue ball was displayed 
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randomly at a horizontal peripheral position congruent or incongruent with the orientation of 
the agent’s front (see Figure 8). 
Procedure 
Infants were tested at a time of the day when they were likely to be alert and in good 
mood. Prior to testing, participating families were welcomed in a reception room equipped 
with infant-friendly toys. While the infant explored the room and got acquainted with the 
experimenter, parents were informed about the procedure and gave their written consent for 
the procedure and data collection. The infant and one parent were then escorted to the 
laboratory. Again, the infant was given several minutes to get familiar with the new 
environment. The experimenter then helped the parent to seat the infant in a baby car seat 
(Maxi-Cosi Cabrio), in approximately 60 cm viewing distance to the monitor. During the 
entire session, the parent remained in the testing room, seated behind the infant. The parent 
was asked not to talk to or interact with the infant, but to comfort the infant by putting the 
hands close to the infant whenever necessary. The experimenter was seated behind a screen 
and was invisible for the infant throughout the session. In the beginning of each session, a 9-
point infant calibration of the eye tracker was performed, with looming contracting and 
expanding spheres accompanied by a sound. After calibration, the presentation of the video 
clips started. Each trial started with a contracting and expanding cross in the center of the 
screen, accompanied by a sound. Once the infant fixated the cross, the video demonstration 
began. Four familiarization trials were shown in the beginning of each session. After 
familiarization, eight cueing trials were presented. From there on, one familiarization trial 
followed a block of eight cueing trials. Five blocks of cueing trials were presented such that if 
they completed the entire session, infants saw a total of 40 cueing trials interrupted by a total 
of eight familiarization trials.  
Data Analysis 
Eye tracking data were analyzed using the software MATLAB (MathWorks, 2007). 
Infants had to have watched a minimum of four familiarization trials and a minimum of six 
valid spatial cueing trials in order to be included in data analysis. A trial was declared valid if 
the infant had looked at the cue for a minimum of 100 ms and if the latency until gaze arrival 
on the target was greater than 100 ms. Trials with latencies deviating more than 2 SD from the 
individual average reaction time of all trials were excluded from further analysis. On a group 
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level, infants with reaction times on congruent or incongruent targets deviating more than 3 
SD from the group average reaction time were excluded from the analysis.  
5.2.3 Results 
Prior analyses revealed no influence of order or shape of front on reaction times. All 
data from the sample were thus collapsed for the following analyses. Infants in the analyzed 
sample completed an average number of 13.18 valid trials (SD = 4.56). To assess general 
effects of movement on attention, a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
the between-subjects factor condition (no-contact, contact, baseline) was performed on the 
dependent variable gaze latency. A significant main effect for the factor condition, F(2, 42) = 
4.39, p = .019, was obtained. Post hoc tests (α-level Bonferroni-corrected) revealed that gaze 
latencies in the baseline condition (M = 1168.8; SD = 550.24) were significantly longer than 
in the no-contact condition (M = 739.32; SD = 242.3; p = .023), but did not differ from those 
in the contact condition (M = 164.15; SD = 373.11; p = .137); no differences were found 
between no-contact and contact condition (p = .707). These results indicated that 
disengagement of attention was facilitated if the infants had observed the agent in agentive 
motion.  
In the baseline condition, no congruent respective incongruent trials were specified 
because the cue did not provide the infant with any previously perceived directional 
information. However, on the basis of previous research (Wronski & Daum, 2013; Hernik et 
al., 2013), we had specific assumptions regarding attentional orienting in the no-contact and 
contact condition. Thus, further analyses were performed within these groups to investigate 
infants’ ability to infer directional information from the cue. Separate repeated measurement 
t-tests on the difference between gaze latencies on congruent and incongruent targets were 
performed for each group (p-values were Bonferroni-adjusted for multiple testing). In the no-
contact condition, gaze latencies for congruent targets (M = 568.03, SD = 271.37) were 
significantly shorter than for incongruent targets (M = 872.69, SD = 371.05), t(14) = -2.51; p 
= .025. Eleven out of fifteen infants showed individually shorter gaze latencies on congruent 
compared to incongruent targets, z = 1.549, p = .118 (binomial test). No cueing effect for 
congruent targets was observed for average gaze latencies in the contact condition (Mcongr
 = 
720.32 ms, SDcongr = 448.48; Mincongr = 943.31 ms, SDincongr = 744.47, t(14) = -0.89;  p = .386), 
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with 9 out of 15 infants showing an individual cueing effect in the proportional gaze latencies, 
z = .52; p = .607 (binominal test).  
5.2.4 Discussion 
The present study was designed to investigate 7-month-old infants’ ability to infer a 
novel agent’s direction of orientation on the basis of previously observed behavioral cues. 
More precisely, we measured covert shifts of attention into the direction of a novel agent’s 
orientation after a familiarization phase in which the agent was shown to move toward 
another object. In the “no-contact” condition, the agent moved autonomously, in the “contact” 
condition, the object’s movement trajectory was identical but not autonomous, guided by the 
elements in the scene. Gaze latencies in the no-contact condition were shorter than in a 
baseline condition in which infants had no dynamic information about the agent, but did not 
differ from latencies in the contact condition. This general facilitation effect indicates that 
infants in the no-contact condition expected the agent to continue moving, whereas infants in 
the baseline and contact condition did not (for a similar rationale using a different measure see 
Hernik et al., 2013). However, apart from this undirected expectation, infants in the no-
contact condition showed a cueing effect for targets appearing congruent to the agent’s 
directional orientation in subsequent test trials, indicating that infants that had seen agentive 
movement characteristics identified the agent’s directional orientation. A mere low-level 
explanation (i.e., saliency effects due to the agent’s frontal contact with the ball) can be 
rejected on the basis of the null results in the contact condition where the low-level movement 
characteristics were identical as in the no-contact condition.  
These findings support and extend prior studies investigating the effects of movement 
on infants’ perception of directional information in inanimate objects (Wronski & Daum, 
2013). Different explanations can account for this ability. The first explanation refers to 
infants’ capability of associating the self-propelled agent’s morphology with an action goal 
and representing this goal even in its absence. Evidence that infants link action goals to 
unfamiliar, inanimate objects comes from habituation studies measuring infants’ goal 
expectation after repeated exposure to a goal approach by an inanimate object (Luo & 
Baillargeon, 2005; Luo, 2011; Schlottmann & Ray, 2010). Twelve-month-olds have been 
reported to assign a specific action goal to a novel agent that displays contingent interaction 
with another person in a habituation paradigm (Shimizu & Johnson, 2004). On this account, 
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infants in the no-contact condition would have linked the self-propelled agent’s orientation to 
the ball and expect the ball to reappear at a location congruent with the agent’s orientation.  
A second interpretation of the results refers to infants’ capability of endowing the 
inanimate object with a perceptual orientation, and thereby attributing epistemic capabilities 
to the agent (e.g., to actively orient visual attention to the world). In fact, gaze following 
studies provide evidence that infants endow inanimate and faceless objects with a perceptual 
orientation on the basis of previously observed contingent behavior. For example, in a study 
by Johnson, Slaughter and Carey (1998), 12-month-olds showed gaze following according to 
the orientation of a faceless object if they had observed the object contingently interacting 
with another person. Moreover, perception is also attributed to unfamiliar, morphologically 
ambiguous objects by 14 to 15-month-olds if that object interacts contingently with a 
confederate (Johnson et al., 2008). Indirect support comes from studies linking self-propelled 
and contingent movement to the perception of animacy. Animacy attributions to geometrical 
object on the basis of movement patterns and context-sensitive behavioral changes have been 
found in adult studies (Santos et al., 2008; Schultz & Bülthoff, 2013; Tremoulet & Feldman, 
2006); similar movement patterns have lately been demonstrated to evoke different 
electrophysiological responses in 9-month-olds than inanimate movement patterns (Kaduk, 
Elsner, & Reid, 2013), providing evidence that infants discriminate between animate and 
inanimate movement patterns. If infants in the no-contact condition categorized the agent not 
only as agentive but also as animate, they might have interpreted the agent’s frontal features 
as sensory organs.  
A third, less mentalistic explanation supposes that infants categorized the novel agent 
as goal-directed per se, without actually representing a specific action goal. Instead, infants 
might have formed more abstract attributions of goal-directedness to the agent on the basis of 
repeated exposure to a situation in which the agent acted causally upon another object. One 
example for this type of agency categorization is infants’ perception of human hands. Hands 
are agents per se because they act upon and manipulate things. Even without a specific action 
goal, the familiar morphology of human hands therefore contains directional information for 
infants (Daum & Gredebäck, 2011b; Wronski & Daum, 2013). Results obtained in the present 
study indicate that infants readily categorize even unfamiliar, nonhuman objects as goal-
directed agents even after brief exposure to its behavior. These findings demonstrate infants’ 
capability to relate a novel agent’s morphology – similar to familiar bodily structures - to their 
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causal behavior toward their environment. For the results obtained in the present study, we 
favor this third interpretation for two reasons: First, if the effects observed in the no-contact 
condition were caused by the infants’ associating the self-propelled agent’s orientation with a 
specific target object, it is unlikely that this association would not decline after repeated 
demonstrations of the ball appearing at random locations throughout testing. Second, we have 
no evidence from our data that infants’ identification of the agent’s front necessarily 
corresponded with the attribution of epistemic states to the agent, so we favor a more 
parsimonious interpretation. However, since previous research has indicated that infants do 
take perceptual states into account when reasoning about agents (S. C. Johnson et al., 2008), 
future research should find manipulations that allow more definite conclusions about the 
cognitive processes influencing the type of attentional orientation during the observation of 
agents.  
To conclude, the present study demonstrates that infants infer a novel agent’s direction 
of orientation from its previously observed behavior and that they orient their own attention 
accordingly. Our findings further demonstrate that infants are highly sensitive toward 
relationships between an agent’s shape and its behavior in relation to its environment, and 
quickly link morphological features with directional information.   
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The influence of communicative cues on visual attention during the observation of an 
unfamiliar, dynamic agent was assessed in 7-month-old infants. In a baseline condition, 
infants saw a rotating movement of a geometrical object. In three communicative conditions, 
additional communicative cues were provided (gaze only, voice only, or gaze and voice). All 
conditions captured infants’ attention alike, but conditions with gaze or voice present 
maintained attention to the stimulus longest. Conditions with voice present resulted in faster 
gaze latencies toward a peripheral target. Results demonstrate that infants’ attention is 
captured and guided by communicative agency cues during the observation of an unfamiliar, 
dynamic agent. It is further argued that synchronous perception of movement direction and a 
referential vocal cue enhances referential expectations in infants.  
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5.3.1 Introduction 
An infant’s world is full of unknown, dynamic objects. Among these, some are alive, 
pursue goals, and are potential communicative partners. With little conceptual knowledge 
about the world, infants’ ability to detect these intentional agents depends chiefly on their 
perception of behavioral cues like certain movement characteristics which have been argued 
to serve as triggering input to specific agency modules (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1995). It 
is well established that agentive movement (e.g., self-propelled movement) captures infants’ 
attention toward even unfamiliar, inanimate objects and elicits expectations of goal-directed 
behavior (Csibra, 2008; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005; Schlottmann & Ray, 2010; Wronski & 
Daum, 2013).  
Apart from pursuing action goals, agents also maintain communicative intentions, 
aimed at directing the addressee’s attention toward an object of communication (Sperber & 
Wilson, 1995). Similar to agentive movement, the detection of communicative agency has 
been proposed to rely on the activation of innate systems which are triggered by the 
perception of certain communicative signals used by the communicator to indicate a 
communicative intention to the addressee. These ostensive cues – for example, eye contact, 
eyebrow raising, turn-taking contingent reactivity, or being addressed in infant-directed 
speech - have been proposed to evoke two kinds of expectations in the addressee: An 
expectation that the communicator is providing relevant information (Csibra & Gergely, 
2009), and an expectation of reference (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Gergely, 2011). It can 
therefore be proposed that the perception of ostensive cues alters infants’ attention toward an 
agent in a way that prepares the infant to attend to and process relevant information. While 
infants’ sensitivity toward ostensive cues from humans is well documented (Gergely, 2011), 
few studies have addressed the question to what extend infants process communicative signals 
in novel, nonhuman agents (e.g., Johnson et al., 2008; Okumura, Kanakogi, Kanda, Ishiguro, 
& Itakura, 2013a). The present study aims to contribute to this issue by investigating how the 
presence of ostensive cues modulates 7-month-olds’ attention toward an inanimate, dynamic 
object.  
Two of the most important cues for communicative agency are eye gaze and referential 
voice (Gergely, 2011). Adult studies have shown that eye gaze serves as a referential mean in 
social interactions in joint attentional contexts by guiding attention toward an external object: 
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Gaze direction is processed rapidly and automatically (Langton & Bruce, 2000), and even the 
observation of gaze shift of schematic eyes in a line drawing of a face results in reflexive 
covert orienting toward the location cued by the direction of eye gaze (Friesen & Kingstone, 
1998). This cueing effect is reflexive, even stronger so than cueing by other directional cues, 
such as arrows (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen, Ristic, & Kingstone, 2004). Sensitivity toward 
the referential nature of human gaze is present early in infancy: Newborns make faster 
saccades toward a peripheral location cued by the gaze direction of a centrally displayed 
schematic face (Farroni, Massaccesi, Pividori, & Johnson, 2004), by three to four months, 
infants follow the gaze of another person (D’Entremont, Hains, & Muir, 1997; Hood, Willen, 
& Driver, 1998), and eight-month-olds expect a referent object to appear at a location 
congruent to an adult’s gaze direction (Csibra & Volein, 2008).  
Similar to their early sensitivity for gaze, human infants are “biased to” the human voice and 
prefer speech over non-speech acoustic signals (Vouloumanos & Werker, 2004, 2007). 
Especially infant-directed speech – characterized by slower tempo, higher pitch and more 
modulation in frequency and amplitude – is easily detected (Colombo, Frick, Ryther, Coldren, 
& Mitchell, 1995), captures infants’ attention (Cooper & Aslin, 1990; Fernald, 1985) and 
guides their social preferences (Schachner & Hannon, 2011). As an emotional cue, voice 
guides infants’ behavior in social referencing situations (Mumme, Fernald, & Herrera, 1996; 
Vaish & Striano, 2004). As a social cue, voice directs joint attention toward objects and 
thereby enhances object learning in infancy (Parise, Cleveland, Costabile, & Striano, 2007).  
In sum, sensitivity to communicative cues in early infancy is well documented, but 
many questions regarding infants’ perception of communicative agency remain unanswered. 
For example, how does the perception of ostension modulate infants’ attention toward a novel 
agent? More specifically, how do attentional processes reflect an infant’s expectation of 
relevance and reference during the perception of ostensive cues? We argue that these two 
types of expectation influence attention in different ways: An expectation of relevance should 
increase attentional engagement toward a stimulus, and an expectation of reference should 
subsequently facilitate disengagement from the communicator and orienting of attention 
toward the referent of communication. To address these questions, we manipulated the 
presence of two communicative cues– human referential voice and eye gaze – during the 
presentation of a dynamic, inanimate object in a 2x2-design. Two different types of 
visuospatial attention – attentional engagement toward the object and attentional 
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disengagement - were assessed applying a spatial cueing paradigm. In our view, these two 
types of attentional modulation are fundamental for the interaction with communicative 
agents. Attending to the source of a communicative signal is a prerequisite for identifying the 
communicator and interpreting the signal in context with bodily movements providing 
additional referential information. A referential expectation should then facilitate 
disengagement and orienting of attention – enabling joint attention toward an external object 
the communicator is referring to. Based on previous literature on infants’ sensitivity to eye 
gaze and infant-directed speech reported above, we therefore expected to find increased visual 
attention (i.e., longer gaze durations) toward the novel object in conditions where one of the 
two ostensive cues was present compared to a condition without ostensive cues. Different 
hypotheses can be proposed for the disengagement of attention, as measured by gaze latencies 
upon appearance of a target stimulus. If infants appreciate the referential nature of the novel 
agent’s gaze similar to that of human gaze, then gaze cueing effects similar to those found for 
human gaze shifts (Farroni et al., 2004; Hood et al., 1998) should be observed. However, if 
gaze from nonhuman agents was not perceived as referential, no such cueing effect for a 
specific target would be elicited. In contrast to gaze direction, infant-directed speech does not 
refer to a spatial location by itself – a spatial reference only becomes evident if voice is linked 
to a gesture or body movement. Thus, whereas the perception of reference from human voice 
should elicit an undirected facilitation of attentional disengagement compared to no-voice 
conditions, a cueing effect to a specific target location in this condition would depend on the 
infants’ ability to link the referential character of the voice to the object’s movement direction. 
5.3.2 Method 
Participants 
A sample of 72 7-month-old infants (40 male, 32 female, mean age: 211.61 d, SD = 
8.00 d) participated in the study. Additional n = 15 infants participated but were excluded 
from further analysis because testing had to be aborted due to the infant becoming fussy 
during the session a (n = 8), because poor calibration resulted in too little data (n = 5), or 
because individual gaze latencies deviated more than three SD from group mean (n = 3). All 
infants were born full-term (37 - 42 weeks gestation) and with normal birth weight (> 2,500 
g). Parents gave informed consent before the study. The study was approved by the local 
ethics committee and was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.  
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Materials and Design 
Colorful videos of a 3D-animated object were presented with the software ClearView 
(Version 2.7.1; Tobii Technology, Sweden) on a Tobii 1750 near-infrared eye tracker with an 
infant add-on (precision: 1°, accuracy: 0.5°, sampling rate: 50 Hz). Each video began with the 
presentation of a colorful looming toy (a ball or a rattle; 3.5 x 3.5. visual degrees) presented at 
the center of the screen, accompanied by a sound (attention-getter). During the videos, an 
animated box-like geometrical object (cue) was presented on a black background at the center 
of the screen. In the beginning of each video, the cube was presented static for a period of 500 
ms before it was rotated 90 degrees along its vertical axis to the left or right side of the screen. 
In its maximal extension (lateral view), the cube’s dimensions were 10.2 x 6.4 visual degrees. 
The rotation movement lasted 2,000 ms. In combination with the still frame in the beginning, 
the total duration of the animation was 2,500 ms. After this period of time, the cube 
disappeared, and the blank screen was presented for 320 ms. This procedure was chosen to 
avoid a continuation of eye movements during target presentation. Following this gap, the 
same object that had served as the attention-getter appeared at a location at the periphery of 
the screen (target). To increase attractiveness of stimuli and maintain infant’s attention 
throughout the test session, the cube’s color was varied between green and red among trials. 
The presence and absence of the two communicative cues gaze and voice was manipulated in 
a 2x2 design: In the baseline condition, no cues were present. The cube was plain, with no 
other features marking its front or back. In the gaze-only condition, schematic eyes were 
added to the cube’s frontal face such that the rotating movement lead to the impression that 
the cube was turning towards and looking at a location at the left or right periphery of the 
screen. In the voice only condition, the cube was plain and the rotation was accompanied by a 
human voice saying “look, there” in an infant-directed tone. Finally, in the gaze-and-voice 
condition, both communicative cues were presented simultaneously with the cube’s 
movement. In half of the trials, the target was presented in direction with the movement 
direction of the cube’s front, in the other half of the trials in the opposite direction. This 
procedure was chosen to ensure that the cube’s movement direction was not predictive of the 
location of target appearance and thereby to prevent learning of spatiotemporal relationships 
between the cube’s movement direction and location of target appearance. Order of movement 
direction, target appearance and object color were pseudo-randomized, ensuring that none of 
these features was repeated more than three times in a row. Infants were assigned randomly to 
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one of the four conditions, with 18 infants participating in each condition. Within the 
conditions, each infant was randomly assigned to one of four randomization orders.  
Procedure 
Participating families were welcomed in a reception room equipped with infant-
friendly toys. While the infant got familiarized with the experimenter and the new 
environment, parents were informed about the procedure and gave their written consent for 
the procedure and data collection. The infant and one parent were then escorted to the 
laboratory. The experimenter helped the parent to seat the infant in a baby car seat (Maxi-Cosi 
Cabrio), approximately 60 cm viewing distance to the monitor. During the entire session, the 
parent remained in the testing room, seated behind the infant. The parent was asked not to talk 
to or interact with the infant, but to provide comfort to the infant whenever necessary. The 
experimenter sat behind a screen and was invisible for the infant throughout the session. In 
the beginning of each session, a 9-point infant calibration was performed. After calibration, 
the presentation of the video clips started. Once the infant had looked at the toy, 
demonstration of the videos began. Presentation continued until the infant had seen a 
maximum of 64 trials or until the testing had to be aborted due to the infant becoming fussy.  
Data Analysis 
Areas of interest (AOI) were defined for the first 1,500 ms of the cube’s movement 
(7.9 x 10.8 visual degrees), the second 1,000 ms of the cube’s movement (10.8 x 10.8 visual 
degrees), and the target (7.1 x 7.1 visual degrees). Data from eye tracking were analyzed 
using the software MATLAB (MathWorks, 2012). A trial was declared valid if the infant had 
looked at the object for a minimum of 400 ms and if the latency until gaze arrival on the target 
AOI was greater than 100 ms. Infants with mean individual latencies deviating more than 3 
SD from the group average latency were excluded from further analysis. In the first part of 
analyses, looking behavior at the object was measured and compared between conditions. 
Proportional gaze durations (i.e. gaze duration on stimulus AOI relative to stimulus duration) 
were calculated for first for the entire duration of stimulus presentation. In addition, to get a 
better temporal resolution of attention during stimulus presentation, proportional looking 
times on the stimulus during the initial phase (still frame plus first 1,000 ms of movement) 
and the remaining phase of the presentation (last, 1,000 ms of movement) were calculated. In 
the second part of analyses, latencies of gaze arrival on the target AOI were measured as an 
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indicator for directing of attention by the stimulus. Proportional gaze latencies were calculated 
by dividing gaze latencies on cued targets by gaze latencies on uncued targets. Proportional 
gaze latencies smaller than one indicate shorter gaze latencies on cued target locations relative 
to uncued target locations.   
5.3.3 Results 
Prior analyses revealed no influence of order or sex on the dependent variables (all p > 
.40). Data from the sample were thus collapsed across these factors for the following analyses. 
Infants in the analyzed sample completed an average number of 26.60 valid trials (SD = 
10.85).  
Capturing and Maintaining of Attention 
A 2 x 2 (Eyes [present, absent] x Voice [present, absent]) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with eyes and voice as between-subject factors yielded no significant main effects 
or interactions (all p > .09) on proportional gaze duration during the entire phase of stimulus 
presentation, indicating that allover looking behavior did not differ between conditions. To get 
a more detailed picture about the temporal dynamics of attentional capturing, two separate 
ANOVAs were performed for the proportional gaze duration of the initial and the second 
phase of stimulus presentation. Gaze duration did not differ between conditions in the first 
part of the movement (all p > .30). In contrast, during the second phase of the movement, the 
ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for the factor eyes, F(1, 86) = 6.19; p = .015; η2 = 
.083, and voice, F(1, 86) = 8.46; p = .005; η2 = .111, indicating longer proportional gaze 
durations if either of the two cues was present, independent from the presence of the 
respective other.  
Disengagement and Orienting of Attention 
Two-way ANOVAs with the between factors eyes (eyes absent, eyes present) and 
voice (voice absent, voice present) were performed separately for allover gaze latencies and 
proportional gaze latencies.  A significant main effect for the factor voice on gaze latencies 
was found, F(1, 68) = 8.6, η2 = .112,  p = .005, indicating shorter latencies in conditions with 
voice  present (M = 337.84, SD = 67.57) compared to when voice was not present (M = 
439.98, SD = 195.07) . No other effect or interaction was found (all p > .580). Furthermore, 
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the ANOVA on proportional gaze latencies revealed a marginal interaction for gaze and voice, 
F(1, 68) = 3.25; p = .076; η2 = .046, indicating that, on a descriptive level, the difference 
between proportional gaze latencies was largest between baseline condition (M = 1.22 ms, SD 
= 0.78) and voice only condition (M = 0.91 ms, SD = 0.2). To further investigate this trend, 
separate t-tests comparing gaze latencies for congruent and incongruent targets were 
performed for these two conditions (α-level Bonferroni-corrected for multiple testing). 
Latencies for congruent targets in the voice only condition (M = 321.71 ms, SD = 78.18) were 
significantly shorter compared to incongruent targets (M = 363.98 ms, SD =96.90), t(17) = -
2.12, p = .049. No such cueing effect for congruent targets was found in the baseline condition 
(Mcongr = 484.89 ms, SD = 308.70; Mincongr = 422.22 ms, SD = 185.59, t(17) = 0.93, p = .363). 
Figure 10 depicts reaction times for congruent and incongruent targets in each of the four 
experimental conditions. 
5.3.4 Discussion 
The goal of the present study was to investigate the role of communicative cues in the 
modulation of visual attention during the observation of an unfamiliar, dynamic object. More 
precisely, our research was motivated by two questions, (1) does the presence of 
communicative cues help infants to establish and maintain visual attention toward an 
inanimate, dynamic stimulus, and (2) in which ways do gaze direction and infant-directed, 
referential speech influence attentional disengagement from the stimulus? In four conditions, 
we varied the presence and absence of two different communicative modalities, eye gaze and 
infant-directed referential voice (none, gaze only, voice only, and gaze and voice) during the 
presentation of a horizontally rotating geometrical object.  
With respect to our first question, we found that while gaze duration did not differ 
between conditions in the beginning of stimulus presentation, infants in gaze and voice 
conditions looked longer at the object toward the end of cue presentation. These results 
indicate that without additional communicative information, the infants’ interest for the 
dynamic object quickly declined whereas the presence of either voice or gaze resulted in 
increased sustained attention. This finding can be interpreted as an adaptation to a 
communicative partner who might provide further relevant information. A mere “low level” 
explanation of visual attention to the saliently marked front of the object in conditions with 
gaze present can be excluded by the fact that the presence of voice alone already resulted in 
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increased gaze durations independent from the presence of gaze. Hence, the well-documented 
attention-capturing effects of gaze and voice (e.g., Cooper & Aslin, 1990; D’Entremont et al., 
1997; Farroni et al., 2004; Fernald, 1985) are not restricted to human agents or static displays 
of schematic faces. The fact that a combination of two ostensive cues had no advantage over 
single presentation might seem counterintuitive. However, results correspond with recent 
electrophysiological data reported by Parise and Csibra (2013): In their study, ostensive 
signals from visual and auditory modalities to elicited overlapping electrophysiological 
activity in 5-month-olds, but the combination of both cues did not result in an increase of 
activation compared to a single cue. The authors argued that at a neuronal level, the 
simultaneous perception of two communicative cues is not processed as “more” 
communicative.  
With respect to our second question, we found that in the conditions with voice 
present, infants showed faster allover gaze latencies toward a peripheral target stimulus, 
indicating that the perception of infant-directed, referential speech enabled the infants to 
prepare withdrawal of attention from the stimulus to an external target. We interpret these 
results as an attentional correlate for a referential expectation (Csibra & Gergely, 2009), that 
is, the anticipation of a referent of communication indicated by the ostensive vocal cue. 
Interestingly, we found no comparable effect in gaze conditions. While gaze and voice equally 
captured attention, infants in our study obviously did not interpret the schematic “gaze” as 
communicative, or referential. In the light of earlier gaze following studies (D’Entremont et 
al., 1997) and gaze cueing studies (Farroni et al., 2004; Hood et al., 1998), this finding is 
somewhat surprising. However, our gaze stimuli differed from those used in earlier studies in 
some ways: In the present study, the eyes were schematic, embedded in a faceless, inanimate 
object, and their appearance was altered during the relatively brief presentation of 2.5 seconds 
due to the object’s rotating movement. Although our eye-like stimuli possessed attention-
capturing features specific to human eyes (i.e., a specific morphology and contrast) (i.e., a 
specific morphology and contrast, Kobayashi and Kohshima, 1997), the lack of a natural 
facial arrangement might have made it difficult for the infants to interpret gaze direction. In 
contrast, results from the more naturalistic voice condition indicated that voice not only 
facilitated attentional disengagement but also played a role in directing attention toward a 
specific target location. Due to the marginal interaction effect for the proportional gaze 
latencies, this issue deserves further investigation. However, recent studies suggest infants 
link gaze to an object (Okumura et al., 2013a), encode its properties (Okumura, Kanakogi, 
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Kanda, Ishiguro, & Itakura, 2013b) or to link a label to the object (O’Connell, Poulin-Dubois, 
Demke, & Guay, 2009) only when observing a human, but not a robot agent. In line with 
these findings we suggest our results provide some evidence for infants’ dependence on 
naturalistic, human-like communicative cues in interpreting communicative intentions.  
A different view on our findings regarding the role of voice concerns infants’ the 
multimodal stimulation provided in voice conditions. In every day communicative situations, 
referential signals are often redundant: Gaze shifts, body movements and vocal cues provide 
multimodal cues to the referent of communication. According to intersensory redundancy 
hypothesis (IRH) proposed by Bahrick and colleagues (Bahrick, Lickliter, & Flom, 2004), this 
multimodal stimulation facilitates encoding of amodal information. In our case of a 
communicative situation, the amodal information that was provided was “reference”: The 
voice condition provided auditory reference as well as a rotating movement. Bahrick and 
colleagues (2004) define redundancy of information as the “spatially coordinated and 
temporally synchronous presentation of the same information across two senses” (p. 100). 
Following this logic, the interplay of movement accompanied by the referential voice 
provided infants in voice conditions with intersensory redundant information of 
“directedness” or “reference”. Recent findings from a study by Daum, Ulber, and Gredebäck 
(2013) support this notion. In their study, pictures of a pointing hand were presented 
simultaneously with auditory cues to 12-month-olds. Infants that heard a communicative, 
human voice (“look, there”) oriented more rapidly toward the direction of the pointing hand 
than infants that heard a nonhuman or meaningless vocal cue – suggesting that meaningful 
and referential vocal cues together with the visual experience of a pointing finger can enhance 
the understanding of this referential gesture. One important aspect of intersensory redundancy 
seems to be the synchrony in which stimuli of different modalities co-occur. Gogate and 
Bahrick (1998) demonstrated that synchronous presentation of object movement and 
vocalizations facilitated learning of speech-object relations in 7-month-old infants. In the 
present study, the rhythm of the vocal cue (“look – there”) was highly synchronous with 
visual event of the object first being oriented toward the infant and then rotated along its 
vertical axis. In our case, the intersensory redundancy of referential information in voice 
conditions elicited referential expectations infants, which facilitated withdrawal of attention 
and orienting toward a location of a potential referent.   
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To conclude, the present study demonstrates that communicative cues – gaze or voice 
– help infants to engage in and maintain visual attention toward a novel, dynamic object. This 
finding underlines infant’s early preparedness for the processing of communicative intentions 
in others. Moreover, it allows infants to quickly identify social interaction partners on the 
basis of very few behavioral cues. Furthermore, disengagement and directional orienting of 
attention in accordance with the movement direction of the object is facilitated by the 
synchronous perception of a visual and auditory directional cue. These attentional processes 
reflect the early sensitivity toward communicative agency cues and suggest that multimodal 
stimulation and perception in communicative contexts in early infancy.  
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Figures 
Figure 9. Snapshots of cue in the baseline and voice only condition (l) and gaze and gaze & voice condition 
(r). 
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